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The Argument for a National RPS 
LINCOLN L. DAVIES 
The debate over a national renewable energy requirement has lost its 
way.  Perhaps one of the most important legislative proposals in recent 
memory because it could transform the United States’ energy 
infrastructure, this “renewable portfolio standard” or “RPS” would likely 
compel electric utilities to obtain one-fifth of their power from renewable 
resources.  Yet the discourse over this proposal has veered from the core 
question it raises.  With thirty-six state RPSs already in place, the key issue 
is not whether there should be an RPS at all but whether a state or federal 
regime will best accomplish the RPS’s objectives.  This Article concludes 
that the evidence overwhelmingly points to the need for a national law.  
The Article reaches its conclusion using three tools: a multi-state survey of 
state RPSs; a newly developed metric of state RPS design, their “efficacy 
tendency”; and extant data on RPS performance.  Finally, the Article 
suggests that another overlooked rationale argues for a federal law: a 
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The Argument for a National RPS 
LINCOLN L. DAVIES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, debate over a national renewable energy 
requirement has been mired in congressional deadlock.  More than twenty-
five proposals for this so-called federal “renewable portfolio standard” 
(“RPS”) have been introduced on Capitol Hill, but not one has passed both 
chambers.  Words have been harsh.  Opponents of the measure have called 
it everything from “a new energy tax”1 to “a huge wealth transfer,”2 from 
“an unneeded subsidy”3 to “a major policy blunder.”4  Proponents, by 
contrast, have been effusive on multiple fronts.  In the RPS, they see the 
United States’ energy future, a law that will “create jobs, save consumers 
money,”5 reduce pollution, “reduce the cost of capital,”6 and “increase our 
energy security and enhance the reliability of the electricity grid.”7  Both 
sides’ positions thus staked, the result has been predictable: an “ossified” 
stalemate, a “long congressional deep freeze.”8 
The federal debate is the result of massive state action.  Since 1983, 
more than two-thirds of the country—thirty-six states9—have adopted their 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.  This Article 
benefited from the insightful comments of Teneille Brown, Phoenix Cai, Brigham Daniels, Jason 
Groenewold, Jim Rasband, Lisa Sun, Buzz Thompson, Chris Whytock, and Amy Wildermuth, and 
from most helpful dialogue at the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Forum, the J. Reuben Clark Law 
Society’s Second Annual Faculty Section Conference, and the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College 
of Law’s Faculty Scholarship Workshop.  Steven Anderson, Jason Groenewold, and Adam Reiser 
provided excellent research assistance.  I dedicate the Article to my grandfather, Sherman D. Davies, 
who is always an inspiration. 
1 151 CONG. REC. S6688 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Talent). 
2 Id. at S6682 (statement of Sen. Craig). 
3 Id. at S6677 (statement of Sen. Alexander). 
4 Robert J. Michaels, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct, 
Economically Suspect, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2008, at 9, 10 [hereinafter Michaels, Politically Correct]. 
5 153 CONG. REC. E311 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Udall). 
6 Renewable Electricity: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th 
Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Ralph Izzo, President, Chairman, and CEO, Public Service Enterprise 
Group, Inc.). 
7 153 CONG. REC. S7597 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). 
8 X, Forget a Federal RPS—Here’s an Idea that Will Work, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2009, at 6, 6. 
9 This Article’s survey includes thirty-five states plus the District of Columbia.  For ease of 
reference, however, this Article refers to those jurisdictions that have adopted RPSs as “thirty-six 
states,” acknowledging of course that the District of Columbia lacks state status.  Recently, Oklahoma 
also adopted an RPS, bringing the “state” total to thirty-seven.  This enactment came too close to 
publication to include within the Article’s survey. 
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own RPSs: laws that require electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage 
of the energy they sell from renewable resources.  This burgeoning trend 
has led some to deem state RPSs the “epitom[e] . . . of state action in the 
absence of strong federal support for renewable energy.”10  Indeed, those 
opposed to a national RPS charge that state efforts represent a regulatory 
“race to the top” that federal action would stunt.  Opponents also assert that 
a national law would unfairly disadvantage those states that are 
comparatively poor in renewable resources, and that the RPS should not be 
perpetuated as a regulatory tool at all because it is cumbersome and 
inefficient in its aims.11  On the other side, those urging a national effort 
have relied on traditional arguments for federal law’s elevation, including 
that state RPSs risk an unmanageable regulatory mélange, that national 
uniformity is needed to fix the state hodgepodge, and, most vociferously, 
that a federal RPS would offer a wealth of societal benefits.12 
Remarkably, missing from this debate is a discussion of what a federal 
law would mean for achieving RPS objectives.  Scholars increasingly point 
to energy deregulation as broken, its attempt to rely on markets a 
regulatory failure.  The flagship examples are Enron and the California 
crisis,13 but the critique cuts more broadly.  Depending on whom you ask, 
electricity deregulation has “faced many challenges”14 or yielded “mixed 
                                                                                                                          
10 Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy from the Bottom-Up?: 
An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95, 107 (2006). 
11 See infra Part IV; cf. BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE 
TOP: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 1–2 (2006), available 
at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf (discussing future opportunities and 
challenges faced by state RPS programs). 
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION, at i 
(2001) (examining a potential need for federal regulation of retail electricity competition); ERIC HIRST, 
THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.eei.org/issues/comp_reg/CALessons_hirst.pdf (arguing that competitive markets are 
successful despite California’s failure at restructuring); MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER 
FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 15 (2003) (discussing the collapse of 
Enron); Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s 
Restructuring Disaster, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 191, 191–92 (discussing California’s attempt 
at regulating electricity markets and the problems in regulating electricity markets in general); Timothy 
P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 
471, 473 (2002) (arguing that California’s failure at restructuring electricity was caused by legislative 
and administrative failure in preventing opportunistic behavior); Paul L. Joskow, California’s 
Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 374 (2001) (discussing the California energy 
crisis); Michael A. Yuffee, California’s Energy Crisis: How Best To Respond to the “Perfect Storm,” 
22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 65 (2001) (arguing that California’s energy crisis was due to “illogical policies and 
poorly designed market structures”); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The 
Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 5 (2004) 
(analyzing the fallout from the failure of Enron and the California energy crisis). 
14 Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting 
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005). 
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results.”15  It has been everything from a “fiasco”16 to a “palpable failure”17 
to “on balance a success.”18  Despite these mixed reviews, commentators 
tend to agree that where deregulation has failed, it is because policy design 
matters.  “Restructuring’s major failures should be blamed not on 
opportunistic behavior by any party or group of parties, but rather on the 
failure . . . to develop precise policy goals and complete performance 
metrics . . . .”19  When proposed legislation would rely on the same market-
based tools that restructuring has used, one would expect the discourse to 
focus heavily on the legislation’s policy aims and design.  Yet this part of 
the RPS debate has not been staged.  There has been virtual silence. 
This Article aims to break the silence.  It takes up a fundamental, yet 
largely unaddressed, question in the RPS debate.  Will the RPS’s core aim 
of promoting renewable energy be more likely accomplished if the law is 
federal rather than state-based?  Or, have sideshows distracted the RPS 
debate from the measure’s central pursuit?  Are politics standing in the 
way of good policy? 
Using a new empirical survey of existing state RPSs and available 
existing data on state RPS performance, this Article seeks to answer these 
questions.  It offers four contributions: 
1.  Evidence of both state RPS design and performance 
strongly favors a national standard.  This Article’s state law 
survey shows that the risk of patchwork regulation is real.  
Reliance on state RPSs frustrates these laws’ very purpose: 
incentivizing deployment of renewable technologies.  It does 
this by creating different market definitions for renewable 
energy and, with even greater variance, for renewable energy 
credits (“RECs”) that can be used to comply with the laws. 
2.  The survey also reveals that state RPSs erect 
geographically-based barriers to trade at an alarming rate.  
More than three-quarters of states impose geographic 
restrictions of one kind or another.  Although commentators 
previously have pointed to the constitutional dilemmas of 
                                                                                                                          
15 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power, 33 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 885, 886 (2002). 
16 Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1141, 1158–59 n.89 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION 
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)). 
17 Robert Kuttner, Keynote Address at the University of North Carolina Center on Poverty, Work, 
and Opportunity and the American Constitution Society for Law and Society: Wealth Inequality and 
the Eroding Middle Class (Nov. 4–5, 2007), in 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 417, 421 (2008). 
18 Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate Re(regulation) 
After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 108 (2005). 
19 Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 28 
ENERGY L.J. 147, 148 (2007). 
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such limits, just as problematic is that geographic barriers 
undermine RPS aims.  Geographic restrictions to trade 
preclude development of a uniform market for renewable 
electric generation technologies, the very market that RPSs 
seek to promote. 
3.  State RPS policy design confirms that a federal 
approach is most appropriate.  Early feedback suggests that 
different state RPSs have varied widely in their success; this 
may well be attributed to divergent policy designs.  This 
Article develops a new four-pronged metric for assessing 
RPS policies, termed the laws’ “efficacy tendency.”20  
Applying this metric reveals that state RPS designs differ 
significantly not only among each other, but also within 
possible policy traits as well.  This only underscores the 
conclusion that a federal RPS, if well designed, has much to 
add to the current state of affairs. 
4.  Another justification for the RPS also supports a 
national approach.  The RPS accomplishes what few 
proposals do—it merges energy and environmental 
objectives.  Historically, these two fields have been at odds.  
Energy law has focused on economics: a reliable energy 
supply at a reasonable price.  Environmental law has centered 
on health and risk: protection from pollutants and moderation 
of resource consumption.  A federal RPS, however, offers an 
opportunity for achieving both objectives.  In the electric 
generation sector at least, a national RPS would ensure a 
diversified energy supply that is reliable, cost-efficient, and 
environmentally friendly.  The RPS debate thus far has 
largely ignored the benefits of such a legal merger. 
The Article proceeds in five substantive parts.  Part II begins by tracing 
the history of electricity regulation.  Part III reviews the RPS, its policy 
objectives, and implementation.  Part IV appraises the federal-state RPS 
debate, outlining the arguments for and against the RPS’s federalization.  
Part V then weighs the direct evidence on the federal-state question, 
employing this Article’s survey of state RPSs and the newly developed 
“efficacy tendency” metric of RPS design.  Part VI concludes by briefly 
assessing whether the RPS’s combination of energy and environmental 
objectives independently advocates for a state or national regime. 
                                                                                                                          
20 See infra Part V.D. 
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II.  THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE:  ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
The field of energy law is vast, even when placed next to 
environmental law’s breathtaking regulatory scope.21  Put the two together, 
and it becomes immediately apparent that the RPS barely scratches the 
surface.  From an energy perspective alone, this is obvious.  Energy falls 
into two categories.  There are “primary” energy sources—the fuels at the 
heart of resource extraction: crude oil, coal, natural gas, nuclear sources, 
and renewables.  And there are “secondary” and “tertiary” energies—the 
refined and processed fuels at the core of how society runs: gasoline, 
synthetic gas, and electricity.22 
An RPS tackles only one of these energy forms, and it touches only 
one aspect of it.  The RPS’s subject is electric generation, specifically, one 
portion of electric utilities’ generation mix.  But even taking electric 
generation alone, the RPS leaves much more untouched.  It does not deal 
with the transport of electricity (“transmission”), even for the renewables it 
seeks to promote.23  It does not address ultimate delivery (“distribution”) or 
day-to-day system operations (“reliability”), even though the use of many 
renewables, particularly wind and solar, heavily impacts that question.24  
And it does not change price (“ratemaking”) or cost recovery (“prudency”) 
determinations, even though investor assurance is very much what RPSs 
are about. 
The RPS, then, is limited in its own sphere, and is further limited when 
one considers everything else that energy regulation controls.  Thus, while 
a national RPS ultimately may raise questions about what shape energy 
law should take,25 most critical to understanding the RPS is not the myriad 
other aspects of energy law,26 but electricity regulation itself. 
                                                                                                                          
21 See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5–6 (2004); JAMES 
SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1–2 (2d ed. 2007); see 
also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short 
History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1003–04 (1994) (examining environmental 
law’s “amazing subject matter diversity”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 22–23 (2001) (arguing that the United States is currently “stuck in 
the same basic regulatory system that was established in the 1970s, when all of the major federal 
regulatory statutes that we currently have were enacted”); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of 
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 238–39, 248–50 (2000) 
(describing the numerous problems environmental law policy seeks to address). 
22 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 402 (2008), 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf [hereinafter EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY 
REVIEW]. 
23 See Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 68 (2008). 
24 See, e.g., Warren C. Kotzmann, Flipping the Switch on Alternative Energy?, 29 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 22–23 (2009). 
25 See infra Part VI. 
26 See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 24, 78, 209, 407, 801, 1179, 1243–44 (2d ed. 2006); JAMES E. HICKEY, JR. ET AL., ENERGY 
LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY §§ 2-1, 4-1, 5-1, 7-1, 8-1, 9-1, 10-1, 11-1, 12-1 (2000).  
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Electricity regulation today is the result of two countervailing 
historical forces: initially, government intervention to mediate imperfect 
competition’s effects, and then, a pendulum-like effort to free industry 
from regulatory restraint.  This cycle of regulation-to-deregulation is not 
unique to energy law,27 but it defines the field.  The clear arc of electricity 
regulation over the past decades reflects a transformation from a highly 
regulated industry where prices and supplies were subject to direct 
governmental review, to a still-regulated industry in which the market 
structure that determines prices and supplies is the subject of governmental 
oversight.  In this sense, energy law’s path is not one of deregulation per 
se, but of restructuring.28  No matter its changes, however, energy law’s 
central objective remains the same: to provide an abundant, stable energy 
supply at a low price.29 
A.  Origins and Objectives 
To place electricity regulation’s origins, nearly ancient history must be 
traced.  Contemporary electricity law has its foundation in the so-called 
“regulatory compact,” a convention dating to common law regulation of 
industries that, today, most observers scarcely would consider energy-
related.30  The purpose of this implicit bargain—what then-Judge Kenneth 
Starr called a fictional government-business “compact of sorts”—is clear.31  
The private company takes on the mantle of the “public utility,” receives a 
legally protected monopoly to serve a specified geographic area and, in 
exchange, assumes the obligation to reliably deliver that service under 
“intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free 
market.”32  The common law thus built the regulatory compact around six 
                                                                                                                          
27 See Duane, supra note 13, at 489–90 (“The apparent success of deregulation in other industries 
(such as airlines, telecommunications, natural gas, trucking) clearly served as a model for deregulation 
advocates in the electricity sector.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 463–64 (2005) (acknowledging the same trends 
among differing industries); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government 
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829 (1998) (describing the cycle of laissez-faire competition to 
regulation to deregulation). 
28 Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory 
Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 781 n.70. 
29 Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
355, 375–76 (1990). 
30 See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 24 (“Regulation of ferries, sewers, mills, bridges, and 
railroads provide the historical origins for modern public utility regulation.”); Jim Rossi, Universal 
Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty To Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 
27, 29 (2000) (describing how current regulation is derived from “ancient” common law). 
31 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring). 
32 Id.; see also Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 104 S.W.3d 225, 227–28 (Tex. 
App. 2003) (“Under a fully regulated system, an electricity utility enters into a ‘regulatory compact’ 
with the public: in return for a monopoly over electricity service in a given area; the utility agrees to 
provide service to all requesting customers and to charge only the retail rates set by the [Public Utility] 
Commission.”). 
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pillars, namely, the utility’s (1) exclusive provision of (2) a public good 
(3) at a reasonable price (4) in a fixed territory, (5) under an obligation to 
serve all members of the public in that area, but (6) subject to revision of 
the compact’s terms as technology evolved.33 
Different commentators offer different rationales for this governmental 
intrusion,34 but the generally accepted justification today is the neoclassical 
economic assertion that regulation is necessary to correct market 
imperfections.35  Electric utilities traditionally have been seen as “natural 
monopolies”:  The first market entrant takes a preference position because 
the cost of building a new system on top of the old one would be 
redundant.36  The “key idea” of the natural monopoly is that limiting a 
market to a single provider can “realize economies of scale.”37  “It is 
relatively inexpensive, for example, to add another electricity end user to a 
system once generation, transmission, and distribution are constructed.”38  
The very notion of the regulatory compact, then, hinges on a theory of 
economic efficiency, to wit, an attempt to ensure less expensive service for 
the public from one utility rather than having multiple companies battle to 
a price through competition.  Because the regulatory compact cements a 
firm’s position as a monopoly, however, it raises the concern that the 
utility will charge supra-competitive rates—that it will unilaterally increase 
prices (and its own profits) because it faces no competition.39  For this 
reason, the flipside of the regulatory compact’s guarantee of exclusivity is 
the utility’s obligation of “reasonable” rates.40 
From the perspective of electricity, the net result of the regulatory 
compact was the nationwide emergence of “vertically integrated” utilities, 
                                                                                                                          
33 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 46. 
34 See, e.g., George Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the “Theories of Regulation” 
Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (1993). 
35 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 51.  But see Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its 
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548–49 (1969) (challenging the natural monopoly rationales for 
regulation); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 447–
48 (2002) (summarizing critiques of the natural monopoly as a regulatory justification). 
36 See Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual 
Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138–39. 
A natural monopoly arises when the average costs of producing a product or 
service declines as more of the product or service is supplied to the market.  Because 
of declining average costs, it is more efficient from the perspective of lowering the 
average cost of production to have one firm serve the market rather than duplicate 
expenditures.  Average costs are falling either because there are huge fixed costs to 
production or because the costs of producing an additional unit of the product or 
service is negligible. 
Id.; accord SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 22–24 (1988); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 513–14 (1989). 
37 Joseph P. Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 242, 
242 (2002) [hereinafter Tomain, Natural Monopoly]. 
38 Id. 
39 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–16 (1982). 
40 See Rossi, Universal Service, supra note 30, at 34–35; Tomain, Natural Monopoly, supra note 
37, at 242; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 57–58. 
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“one-stop-shopping” companies that generated their own power, moved 
that power vast distances over bulk transmission systems they built and 
owned, and then ultimately delivered the power to retail customers using 
the companies’ own local distribution lines.  For decades, these companies 
dominated the industry under the rosy perception that the public was being 
served, the compact worked, and all was well.41  This began to unravel, 
however, when in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, electricity prices 
precipitously climbed, and the massive capital investments that utilities had 
been sinking into their systems came under heightened political scrutiny.42  
Close behind was legislative willingness to tinker with the status quo,43 
followed by a bevy of studies urging industry transformation.44 
Through all of this, the singular objective of the regulatory compact 
remained constant—reliable service at reasonable rates—but the regulatory 
mechanisms used to get there did not.  They changed, dramatically. 
B.  Mechanisms 
Over time, the mechanism invoked to carry out electricity regulation’s 
task became almost as entrenched as the regulatory compact itself.  
Enacted in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)45 set the framework 
for the governance of virtually all utilities and common carriers.  It created 
an administrative agency charged with closely monitoring the industry and 
ensuring that it “provided services in standardized packages at 
standardized prices to all similarly situated end-users.”46  What soon 
followed were industry-specific statutes spreading the ICA’s approach 
across society.47  Most notably for the electric sector, Congress in 1920 
                                                                                                                          
41 See Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and Expectations in the 
Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1337 (2006) (arguing that the vertically integrated 
electric utility “may have reflected the most efficient arrangements available to the United States” in 
the twentieth century); Rossi, Universal Service, supra note 30, at 32 (noting efficiencies of vertical 
integration). 
42 Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 450–51. 
43 Id. at 451–54; accord Pierce, supra note 27, at 453–55. 
44 See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE 
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR 
POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal 
to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
345 (1983). 
45 24 Stat. 379 (1887).  The ICA established the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”), which regulated, among other things, railroads.  The ICC’s functions now reside with the 
Surface Transportation Board.  ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 
(1995); see also Overview of Surface Transportation Board, http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/about/ 
overview.html (last visited June 17, 2010). 
46 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998). 
47 See, e.g., Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950) 
(“The plan or scheme of the Federal Power Act is analogous to that of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
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created the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), now succeeded by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),48 and passed a key 
statute it administers, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).49 
The FPA implemented the regulatory compact through a dual mandate.  
First, it created a command-and-control regime with wholesale electricity 
and transmission prices subject to FERC oversight.  FERC thus became 
obligated to use its expertise to ensure that rates strike a balance between 
investors and consumers.  Rates charged under the FPA must be “just and 
reasonable”50—a regulatory term-of-art for prices that (1) assure a fair 
return on stockholder investment and the continuing attraction of capital 
but (2) do not overcharge consumers.51  Such rates also must be 
nondiscriminatory; the FPA prohibits FERC-jurisdictional utilities from 
giving “any undue preference or advantage” to customers.52  In addition, 
rates subject to the FPA cannot be collected until they have been submitted 
for FERC review—and then only those rates and no others can be 
charged.53 
Second, the FPA charged FERC with overseeing proposed utility 
mergers, as well as sales, leases, and transfers of certain utility-owned 
assets.54  The primary purpose of this authority was to ensure that utilities 
do not use mergers and acquisitions as a backdoor to unfairly increase 
profits by cross-subsidizing their non-utility affiliates.55  Combined with 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (“PUHCA”),56 which 
sought to reverse the growing “wave of consolidation[]” of utilities into 
non-energy-related holding companies across the nation,57 FERC gained 
                                                                                                                          
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and decisions under the latter Act should be controlling here.”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 
246, 255 (1951). 
48 For convenience, this Article uses “FERC” to refer both to the FPC and FERC itself. 
49 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–823d (2006).   The 1920 enactment governed hydroelectric power.  In 1935, 
amendments to the FPA expanded FERC’s authority over electric transmission and wholesale power 
sales.  Id. §§ 824–824w.  In 1938, Congress passed the FPA’s counterpart for the natural gas industry, 
the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).  15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2006).  For a pithily insightful history of the 
FPA, see Richard D. Cudahy, 70th Anniversary Celebration of the Federal Power Act, 26 ENERGY L.J. 
389 (2005).  For a broader evaluation, see DAVID HOWARD DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS (4th ed. 1993). 
50 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
51 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603–06 (1944) (holding that a 
rate set by the FPC that enabled a gas company to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity, 
attract capital, and compensate its investors was valid); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 689–92 (1923) (holding that a rate set by the PSC was unjust and 
unreasonable because it failed to accord proper weight to the enhanced costs of construction). 
52 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b).  If FERC believes that previously approved rates have become “unjust 
and unreasonable” or discriminatory, it has the power to investigate and correct the situation.  Id. 
§ 824e(a). 
53 Id. § 824d(c)–(e).  This is the ironclad rule of utility law known as the “filed rate doctrine.”  
See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981). 
54 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a). 
55 Id. § 824b(a)(4). 
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6 (2006). 
57 Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific 
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 190–91 (1983); see 
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immense control not only over electricity rates, but also over the very 
structure of the industry.58 
Initially, and long thereafter, FERC carried out its FPA duties using 
“cost-of-service” ratemaking.  The agency tied utility rates to the 
investments they actually made in their systems, and then sought, 
administratively, to replicate price levels that would give utilities the kind 
of return on their investment they would have made if the market were 
competitive.59  However, concerns that traditional cost-of-service 
ratemaking was inherently flawed,60 coupled with the arrival of non-utility, 
or “independent,” power producers,61 ultimately led FERC to allow utilities 
to begin charging “market-based” rates.62  In this emerging regime, the 
new theory was that if FERC policed markets to ensure that they were 
functionally competitive, the FPA’s “just and reasonable” requirement 
would be fulfilled.  That is, actually competitive rates would be more 
accurate, and more efficient, than cost-of-service ratemaking’s crude and 
cumbersome effort at merely approximating competition.63 
                                                                                                                          
also Nidhi Thakar, Note, The Urge To Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 913 (2008) (“In 1926 alone, there were more 
than 1000 mergers, most of which involved sales of public utilities to private companies . . . controlled 
by large holding companies.”). 
58 FERC jointly administered PUHCA with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 largely repealed PUHCA.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2006); see also 
Repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and Enactment of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,592, 75,592–93 (Dec. 20, 2005) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pts. 365 & 366); Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What Is Next for 
Holding Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2–3, 24 (2006) (examining the conditions that gave rise to 
PUHCA and the changes that resulted in its repeal); infra Part II.C (examining FERC’s role in 
regulating the industry). 
59 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 78–79.  The details of cost-of-service ratemaking are 
extraordinarily complex.  See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 
109, 112–20 (2d ed. 1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 435–36 (3d ed. 1993). 
60 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive 
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 551, 609 (1979) (examining the problems with 
various modes of classical regulation).  Cost-of-service ratemaking is time-consuming and expensive, 
and agency economists face immense informational asymmetries. 
61 See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 
ENERGY L.J. 419, 425 (1995); Tomain, Natural Monopoly, supra note 37, at 451–53. 
62 See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234, at p. 61,760 (1992); Dartmouth Power Assocs. 
Ltd. P’ship, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,117, at pp. 61,358–59 (1990); Doswell Ltd. P’ship, 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251, 
at pp. 61,757–58 (1990). 
63 See Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 128 S. 
Ct. 2733, 2747–48 (2008) (holding that FERC can only declare a mutually agreed-upon contract for 
electricity as unjust and unreasonable when the public consumer is seriously harmed); La. Energy & 
Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that 
FERC may rely on market-based rates in a competitive market to satisfy the “just and reasonable” 
requirement); Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (holding that FERC’s approval of market-based rates does not violate its obligation to ensure just 
and reasonable rates).  There are, however, opponents to market-based rates.  See, e.g., Jeffrey 
McIntyre Gray, Reconciling Market-Based Rates with the Just and Reasonable Standard, 26 ENERGY 
L.J. 423, 429–31 (2005) (explaining that FERC cannot ensure just and reasonable rates if it cannot 
assure that a competitive market exists); Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely on Markets To Set 
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Market-based rates were the opening shot in the electric power 
regulatory revolution.  The old school of thought that electric utilities were 
natural monopolies by definition gave way to a new vision that the 
monopoly could be disaggregated into “its three component parts: 
generation, transmission, and distribution.”64  Under this vision, traditional 
utilities could compete with other companies for power sales, while the 
only true “bottleneck” facilities with actual natural monopoly attributes—
the transmission and distribution systems—could be opened for all 
comers.65  And thus, the “great transformation” of the industry began.66 
Rather than dictating prices directly, FERC invoked novel instruments 
to regulate the markets, and then let the markets set the price.  FERC 
created a standardized, though complex,67 test for assessing where and 
when generation owners could unduly influence electric prices—and, by 
extension, where they would and would not be allowed to charge market-
based rates.68  It institutionalized a similar screen for reviewing mergers, 
seeking to prevent deals that could dampen, rather than promote, 
competition.69  It compelled utilities that owned transmission lines to offer 
service over those facilities on a first-come, first-serve basis to any 
                                                                                                                          
Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY L.J. 65, 66, 88 (2003) (concluding that FERC does not have the authority 
under existing law to use market-based rates to set the standard). 
64 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC 
POWER INDUSTRY: AN UPDATE, at ix, 1 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/ 
electricity/056296.pdf; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY: A CAPSULE OF ISSUES AND EVENTS 1 (2000), available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/other/booklet.pdf. 
65 See Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment 
in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2005); Roger Ridlehoover, 
The Role of Entry in Deregulating Gas and Electricity, 19 ENERGY L.J. 307, 310–13 (1998). 
66 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 46, at 1324.  For an in-depth look at electric restructuring, see 
generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 2–3 (1999). 
67 Some would also say flawed.  See, e.g., Matthew W.S. Estes, Measuring Market Power with 
FERC’s Appendix A Analysis, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20, 21–24 (2005). 
68 Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services 
by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904 (July 21, 2007), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 
31,252, order on clarification, 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-A, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 25,832 (May 7, 2008), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,268, order on reh’g, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055 
(2008), order on reh’g, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-B, 73 Fed. Reg. 
79,610 (Dec. 30, 2008), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,285, order on reh’g, Order No. 697-C, 127 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,284 (2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 697-D, 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,206 (2010), order on 
clarification, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,021 (2010). 
69 See Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act: Policy 
Statement, Order No. 592, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (Dec. 30, 1996), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044 
(1996), order on reconsideration, Order No. 592A, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,341 (June 19, 1997), 79 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,321 (1997) (Merger Policy Statement); see also FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement, 
72 Fed. Reg. 42,277 (Aug. 2, 2007), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,253 (2007), order on clarification, 
122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,157 (2008); Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the Commission’s 
Regulations, Order No. 642, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,983 (Nov. 28, 2000), FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations 
Preambles July 1996-Dec. 2000 ¶ 31,111 (2000), order on reh’g, Order No. 642-A, 66 Fed. Reg. 
16,121 (Mar. 23, 2001), 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289 (2001). 
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customer that wanted access.70  It sought to ease market entry by clarifying 
rules for new generators to interconnect to the power grid.71  And perhaps 
most revolutionarily—and certainly most controversially—it began 
promoting the coordination of utility operations and power sales through 
the formation of “regional transmission organizations,” or “RTOs”: 
independent companies that take over system operations for multiple 
utilities in an area, seek to centrally coordinate those operations more 
efficiently, and thus, make way for larger, more transparent, liquid, and 
economic power markets.72 
When this flurry of policy activism subsided, a different industry, 
operating under a revamped regulatory regime, emerged.  Utilities across 
the country had sold off their generation assets.73  A bevy of new, largely 
natural gas-fired generators had come online.74  Seven RTOs were in 
operation, and, although not nationwide, could be found from Maine to 
California.75  Market-based, rather than cost-of-service, power contracts 
                                                                                                                          
70 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996), F.E.R.C. Stats. & 
Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 (1997), 
order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Dec. 9, 1997), 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248 (1997), 
order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in part sub nom., Transmission 
Access Policy Study Group v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d 
sub nom., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
71 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, 104 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,103 (2003), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-A, 106 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (2004), order on 
reh’g, Order No. 2003-B, 109 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,287 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003-C, 111 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,401 (2005); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, Order No. 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,190 (June 13, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,180 
(2005), order on reh’g, Order 2006-A, 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195 (2005), order on clarification, Order 
2006-B, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (2006). 
72 See Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000), 89 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285, order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000), aff’d sub 
nom., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard 
Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,327 (Oct. 11, 2002); see also Eisen, supra note 65, at 552–
55; John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 
273, 310 (2004).  More recently, FERC has adopted rules governing power markets within RTOs and 
ISOs.  See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 64,100, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 (Oct. 17, 2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-A, 74 Fed. Reg. 
37,776, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059 (July 16, 2009), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 
(2009). 
73 James B. Bushnell & Catherine Wolfram, Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency: 
The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants 5 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working 
Paper No. CSEM WP 140, 2005), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp140.pdf. 
74 See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 264; see also Tobey Winters, The Rising 
Cost of Electricity Generation, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 57, 58 (explaining that natural gas 
combined-cycle generators increased during the 1990s). 
75 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, RTO/ISO Map (Printable Version), http://www.ferc. 
gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-map.asp (last visited June 17, 2010). 
 2010] POWER FORWARD: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL RPS 1353 
were now the default, not the other way around.76  And competition was 
king.   
Well, mostly. 
C.  Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity 
FERC was not in the restructuring business by itself.  The FPA 
generally limits FERC’s jurisdiction to two key areas: (1) the “transmission 
of electric energy in interstate commerce”; and (2) the “sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”77  Explicitly reserved to state 
regulation are local electricity distribution and retail sales.78  In short, 
although FERC has much regulatory power, states do too.  Most utilities 
are subject to both.  As a result, when historically vertically-integrated 
utilities began divesting their generation fleets, it was at their states’ 
behest.79  Likewise, when the revolution of competition-centered 
restructuring took its final step into retail markets, that too was because 
states called for it.80  FERC may have laid the groundwork for competition 
to permeate the electric industry, but it could not finish the job alone. 
The problem for full and complete competition, however, was that the 
job never was finished.  Retail competition, in most states, stalled.  The 
reasons were manifold.  Restructuring did not deliver the lower prices it 
promised, or new industry entrants did not appear, or the rules were 
fundamentally flawed, or consumers did not care, but either way the result 
was the same.81  The move to retail electric competition quickly became 
moribund.82  Thus, although competition clearly transformed the electric 
                                                                                                                          
76 See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central 
Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (1993) (discussing 
changes that allowed plants to sell wholesale power at market prices). 
77 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006).  This historical bright line was modified to a degree in 1992, 
when FERC gained “wheeling” and other authority, and more drastically in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, when FERC assumed transmission reliability, heavier enforcement, and additional powers.  Id. 
§§ 824i–824w (2006). 
78 Id. § 824(b)(1), (c)–(e); see also New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 
20–24 (2002). 
79 See Bushnell & Wolfram, supra note 73, at 5. 
80 See id. 
81 See Weaver, supra note 13, at 139–40; Christopher G. Bond, Note, Shedding New Light on the 
Economics of Electric Restructuring: Are Retail Markets for Electricity the Answer to Rising Energy 
Costs?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1311, 1311–12 (2001). 
82 See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 18, at 108 (cautioning that one must not “put all your 
eggs in one basket” in terms of energy policy).  A 2007 FTC report summarized the state of the 
transition to retail competition: 
In most profiled states, retail competition has not developed as expected for all 
customer classes.  Few residential customers have switched to alternative providers.  
(Exceptions include Massachusetts, New York, and Texas.)  In most of the profiled 
states, few residential customers have a wide variety of alternative suppliers and 
pricing options. . . . To the extent that multiple suppliers serve retail customers, 
prices have not decreased as expected, and the range of new options and services is 
often limited. 
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sector at the wholesale level,83 that competitive transformation has not, and 
very well may never, reach fully down to the everyday consumer. 
Today, electricity at the local level remains heavily regulated.  State 
public utility commissions control the prices that utilities charge retail 
consumers, review the “prudence” of their power contracts and generation 
acquisition decisions, dictate when and where such facilities may be built, 
and involve themselves in utilities’ plans for the kind and amount of 
generation sources they use.84  Indeed, even in the wholesale context, the 
promise of competition has summoned the specter of inefficiency.  
Charges of gaming, allegations of reciprocal dealing, and proof of clear 
market manipulation have incited both political and regulatory 
backlashes.85  In response, Congress emboldened FERC with powerful new 
enforcement authority,86 and FERC in turn has built a complex web of 
regulation on top of the competition it says it promotes: pervasive market 
rules,87 incentives for installing independent market monitors,88 heightened 
enforcement activity,89 and, in certain circumstances, plain limits on 
                                                                                                                          
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS 
FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1815 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 6–7 
(2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf. 
83 See KENNETH ROSE, INST. OF PUB. UTIL., MICH. STATE UNIV., 2004 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF 
ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/ 
Rose.2004.perf.review.elec.mkts.0804.pdf (“[M]ost states have decided to either discontinue their 
efforts to implement retail access or have stopped considering adopting it altogether . . . . In fact, no 
state has passed restructuring legislation since June of 2000 . . . . A total of 32 states have repealed, 
delayed, suspended or are now no longer considering retail access.”); see also Eisen, supra note 65, at 
558 (discussing the decrease in meaningful competition at the state level); James W. Moeller, Of 
Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 177–78 (2004) (discussing the decrease in competition after Enron and the 
California energy crisis). 
84 See Ralph Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their 
Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 300 (1986); see also Kevin F. Duffy, Will the Supreme 
Court Lose Patience with Prudence?, 9 ENERGY L.J. 83, 84 (1988) (discussing the state commision’s 
ability to examine “prudence”). 
85 Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 19, 2006); see also 
Weaver, supra note 13, at 89–108 (discussing legislative changes to FERC’s powers); Heather Curlee, 
Note, Examining EPAct 2005: A Prospective Look at the Changing Regulatory Approach of the FERC, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1649, 1678–90 (2006) (reviewing FERC’s new regulatory approach). 
86 See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717t-1 (2006) (providing authority for 
FERC to issue civil penalties under the Natural Gas Act). 
87 See, e.g., Amendments to Codes of Conduct for Unbundled Sales Service and for Persons 
Holding Blanket Marketing Certificates, 71 Fed. Reg. 9709 (Feb. 16, 2006). 
88 AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, CONSUMERS IN PERIL: WHY RTO-RUN ELECTRICITY MARKETS FAIL 
TO PRODUCE JUST AND REASONABLE ELECTRIC RATES 32 (2008), available at http://www.appanet. 
org/files/PDFs/ConsumersinPeril.pdf; see also John S. Moot, Whither Order No. 888?, 26 ENERGY L.J. 
327, 327 n.4 (2005). 
89 See Press Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Commission Imposes First Penalties 
Under EPAct Authority (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://ferc.gov/news/news-releases/2007/2007-
1/01-18-07-M-3.pdf (reporting an assessment of $22.5 million in civil penalties under a new civil 
penalty enforcement authority); see also Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, Statement for the Conference on Enforcement Policy (Nov. 14, 2007), available at 
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competition.90  The result is that while the move to restructuring 
“represents a sharp departure from traditional thinking and historical 
practice,”91 the “curious paradox of a market-based regulatory reform is 
that we may end up with more rather than less regulation.”92 
What these conflicting trends ultimately mean for electricity is unclear, 
but the potential range of implications is undeniably important.  If electric 
power is to move forward, if it is to become something different from what 
it is now, policy innovation is necessary.  The industry’s strong history of 
vertical integration, and the regulatory compact itself, are too engrained to 
allow for a new era of energy regulation without a meaningful catalyst.  
Environmentalists consistently question how to make electricity cleaner, 
more efficient, more sustainable93—how to use energy to promote 
environmental goals, a kind of “environmental” electricity, one might 
say—but none of these changes are likely to materialize absent political 
action of some sort.  Consider the results of the industry’s transformation 
to date.  There was a broad move to competition, and some gains in 
economic efficiency as a result,94 but relatively no action on the 
environmental front, even when the policy window for making that move 
should have been so open. 
To be sure, some overtures in this direction have been made.  The very 
statute that helped kick off the rise of independent power producers, the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”),95 embedded 
within its competitive objectives various environmental goals, including 
increasing national renewable energy use.96  Partially in response to 
PURPA, states increasingly implemented the process of “integrated 
resource planning,”97 which can help promote environmentally-friendly 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.ferc.gov/news/statements-speeches/kelliher/2007/11-14-07-kelliher.pdf (“It is a personal 
priority for me as Chairman to strengthen compliance programs in the regulated community.”). 
90 Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services 
by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295, at pp. 404–07 (2007) (recognizing concerns 
that FERC’s market-based rates foreclose utilities from competing in their home service territories). 
91 David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 
767 (2008). 
92 Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 474. 
93 But see Roy Fuller, Wind Energy Development on BLM Lands, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 613, 616–17 (2004) (noting some environmentalists’ resistance to renewables development). 
94 See Blumsack, supra note 19, at 151–52; Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking 
Reform of Electricity Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 542 (2005); Tomain, Electricity 
Restructuring, supra note 27, at 845–46. 
95 Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601–2645 (2006)). 
96 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2006). 
97 Section 111 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required utilities to engage in this process of  
planning . . . for new energy resources [by] evaluat[ing] the full range of 
alternatives, including new generating capacity, power purchases, energy 
conservation and efficiency, cogeneration and district heating and cooling 
applications, and renewable energy resources, in order to provide adequate and 
reliable service to [the utility’s] electric customers at the lowest system cost. 
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energy by requiring utilities to build long-term, forward-looking, publicly-
involved analyses of their generation portfolios.98  Likewise, different 
states have adopted various other measures to make electricity more 
sustainable.  These include efficiency and conservation incentives, such as 
“negawatt” acquisition programs;99 “decoupling” power consumption from 
utility profits;100 removing obstacles to small-scale “distributed generation” 
located on consumers’ premises;101 creating “system benefit funds;”102 and 
eliminating energy-intensive rate structures, such as “declining-block” 
rates, that perversely afford consumers lower prices for using more 
electricity.103 
But despite these efforts, the electric industry’s core is unchanged.  
The market and the market players may be different post-restructuring, but 
total power consumption grows unabated and the mix of electric generation 
fuels, while trending to relatively cleaner natural gas, is not that different 
from decades ago.104  For all the regulatory upheaval, the sum revisions, 
from an environmental perspective at least, have been on the margins.  
Competition alone has not delivered electricity to a new, environmental 
state.105  Alternative energies are still “alternative,” not the norm.106 
                                                                                                                          
16 U.S.C. § 2602(19); see also id. § 2621(d)(7) (providing that “each electric utility shall employ 
integrated resource planning”). 
98 See, e.g., Scott F. Bertschi, Comment, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand-Side 
Management in Electric Utility Regulation: Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 43 EMORY 
L.J. 815, 830 (1994); Cavanagh, supra note 84, at 322–23. 
99 See Black & Pierce, supra note 76, at 1354–69. 
100 See Sandra Levine & Katie Kendall, Energy Efficiency and Conservation: Opportunities, 
Obstacles, and Experiences, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 101, 101 (2006) (asserting that energy efficiency and 
conservation decrease pollution and lower overall energy costs); Jeff D. Makholm, “Decoupling” for 
Energy Distributors: Changing 19th Century Tariff Structures To Address 21st Century Energy 
Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 157, 172 (2008) (discussing the emergence of decoupling and arguing that 
decoupling carries the potential to “reduce the frequency of rate cases”). 
101 Compare Kristin Bluvas, Comment, Distributed Generation: A Step Forward in United States 
Energy Policy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1589, 1614 (2006) (asserting that distributed generation “addresses 
major energy problems such as system instability, infrastructure underinvestment, and fossil fuel 
dependency”), with Anthony Allen, Comment, The Legal Impediments to Distributed Generation, 23 
ENERGY L.J. 505, 522–23 (2002) (discussing the current debate over distributed generation 
implementation and arguing that the benefits of distributed generation are “too plentiful, and too 
compelling to be overlooked”). 
102 Mark Bolinger et al., An Overview of Investments by State Renewable Energy Funds in Large-
Scale Renewable Generation Projects, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 78, 78. 
103 Tomain, Past and Future, supra note 35, at 451–52; see also Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 
94, at 508. 
104 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 42–46. 
105 See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 94, at 542 (“The valuable effort to restructure and reform 
electricity markets is not addressed to reducing the pollution and other environmental problems caused 
by relying on fossil fuels, particularly coal, to generate electricity.”); Fred Zalcman & David Nichols, 
Competition, Environment, and the Electric Industry, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 287, 291 (2001) 
(“Restructuring is driven by economic objectives, not environmental concerns.”). 
106 See Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 75 (2009) (describing the limited consumption of energy obtained 
from alternative sources). 
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III.  THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: THE RPS 
Of the past decades’ legal innovations seeking to simultaneously 
advance energy and environmental objectives, the RPS is perhaps the most 
widely adopted.  The RPS is at once simple and complex.  It is simple in its 
concept.  The RPS requires electric utilities to ensure that a certain 
percentage of retail power they sell comes from renewable resources.  The 
elegance of this approach is obvious.  RPSs harness the power of markets 
to allow participants to find the most efficient result themselves.107  RPSs 
do not specify the use of a certain fuel, but instead allow utilities to choose 
any qualifying renewable fuel based on the characteristics the utility values 
most, whether those are price, quantity, duration, intermittency, reliability, 
fuel diversity, or any combination thereof. 
But the very proviso of what qualifies as “renewable” reveals RPSs’ 
complexity.  Policy questions, such as what counts as renewable, whether 
to preference certain technologies, who is subject to the law, how to 
measure the RPS requirement, and more, inevitably erect an intricate 
regulatory scaffold.  This structure becomes even more sophisticated when 
questions about how to enforce the RPS come into play.  While the RPS 
construct is relatively uncomplicated, actually implementing it is much less 
so.108 
A.  Origins and Objectives 
RPSs are not new—Iowa adopted the first RPS in the United States in 
1983109—but their prevalence is.  In 1996, Iowa remained the country’s 
                                                                                                                          
107 Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2007, at 10, 16 [hereinafter Rabe, Expanding Role]. 
108 Robin J. Lunt, Comment, Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 381 (2007); cf. Joel B. Eisen, The 
Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 295, 310–12 (2005) (explaining the complexity of accounting for electricity generation 
location for RPS purposes). 
109 IOWA CODE § 476.44 (2008).  In many ways, the RPS is the offspring of PURPA and 
integrated resource planning.  The RPS finds a precursor in PURPA because both promote increased 
renewables use.  PURPA required utilities to purchase energy from renewables-based generators at up 
to “avoided cost” (or incentive) rates as long as the renewable source had a “production capacity” of 
eighty megawatts or less.  16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(a)(ii), 824A-3(a) (2006).  The RPS does the same 
thing, but without the eighty megawatt restriction, and without tying the purchase requirement to 
independent power producers. 
The RPS also finds lineage in integrated resource planning because both seek to infuse public 
policy into utility planning decisions.  “Twenty years ago[, utilities’] process of making resource 
decisions was predominantly a function of cost calculation and selection of the ‘least cost’ options.”  
Kotzmann, supra note 24, at 21.  Integrated resource planning changed this.  It imbued utilities’ 
planning with public input and regulatory involvement, swinging their decisions away from cost alone.  
The RPS does the same thing.  It injects a publicly-informed substantive mandate into the planning 
process, namely, that a portion of the utility’s energy comes from renewables. 
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sole RPS adopter.  By 1999, the tally had risen to eight.  And by 2004, the 
figure had more than doubled to eighteen, or half of today’s total.110 
Legislatures cite wide-ranging rationales for RPSs.  Juxtaposition of 
even two states’ approaches illustrate the point.  When Iowa adopted its 
law in 1983, its legislature cited a policy of “encourag[ing] the 
development of alternate energy . . . in order to conserve our finite and 
expensive energy resources.”111  By contrast, enacting its RPS in 2006, 
Washington declared the need to “promote energy independence[,] . . . 
stabilize electricity prices[,] . . . provide economic benefits for Washington 
counties and farmers[, and] . . . protect clean air and water,” just to name a 
few.112  In short, RPSs initially were adopted as a way “to support 
renewable energy development in competitively restructured electricity 
markets,” but today politicians view them as serving much broader aims.113 
Claiming RPSs as environmental-economic-political cure-alls is 
tempting.  It is clear that the RPS has “emerged as one of the most 
important drivers of renewable energy capacity additions” in the United 
States.114  RPSs also can work hand-in-glove with climate change policy to 
help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.115  Developing renewable energy 
projects likewise promises economic benefits in both technology and 
construction, as the recent economic stimulus legislation heavily 
anticipates.116  But these benefits are largely ancillary to RPSs’ core 
objective: promoting a new energy market in renewables to, in turn, spur 
the transition to a sustainably fueled society. 
To be fair, RPSs’ ancillary benefits are hardly trivial.  One set of 
commentators has conceptualized six categories of benefits from 
renewable electricity: (1) “[e]nvironmental benefits, including greenhouse 
gas mitigation;” (2) price and reliability benefits from a more diverse and 
disperse generator mix; (3) preparation, or “readiness,” benefits in the 
event of fuel price spikes or supply disruptions; (4) export potential for 
renewable technologies; (5) long-run national benefits from energy 
independence; and (6) “[s]ustainable-energy-path benefits” such as fossil 
                                                                                                                          
110 RABE, RACE TO THE TOP, supra note 11, at tbl.1. 
111 IOWA CODE § 476.41 (emphasis added). 
112 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2010). 
113 Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing 
Goals and Rules, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 21, 21. 
114 RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 2 
(2008), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf. 
115 See, e.g., Rabe, Expanding Role, supra note 107, at 11–13 (comparing the motivations of the 
Texas and Massachusetts legislatures). 
116 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF ENERGY RELATED PROVISIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 (PUBLIC LAW NO.: 111-005), available 
at http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/statefed/EnergyProvisions_ARRA.pdf. 
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fuel conservation for later generations.117  Benjamin Sovacool and 
Christopher Cooper put a slightly different spin on the question, 
contending that RPSs help “correct three major failures” in the electricity 
markets: electricity pricing’s failure to account for the social costs of 
production, unfair competitive advantages for nuclear and fossil fuels from 
governmental subsidies, and the “free rider problem” that investors do not 
recoup just profits from renewable outlays because everyone benefits from 
renewables deployment.118 
B.  Mechanisms 
The state-adopted RPS typically functions in one or two parts.  First, 
the RPS dictates that certain participants in the retail electricity market, 
usually large utilities but sometimes other players as well,119 acquire a 
certain percentage of their electricity from renewable sources.  This 
percentage then ramps up over time, peaking at a statutory target generally 
years or decades later.  State public utility commissions typically assume 
regulatory oversight.  Penalties and enforcement mechanisms vary widely, 
but the ultimate onus to obtain renewably-fueled power generally rests 
with the electricity provider subject to the RPS.  In this regard, North 
Carolina’s statute is structurally typical of many state RPSs: 
Each electric public utility in the State shall be subject to a 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard 
(REPS) according to the following schedule: 
Calendar Year  REPS Requirement 
2012  3% of 2011 North Carolina retail sales 
2015  6% of 2014 North Carolina retail sales 
2018   10% of 2017 North Carolina retail sales 
2021 [on] 12.5% of 2020 North Carolina retail sales120 
The second regulatory tool that often—but not always—accompanies 
the RPS percentage target is a credit mechanism for “rights” to renewable 
power production.  That is, rather than actually requiring renewable energy 
                                                                                                                          
117 Brent M. Haddad & Paul Jefferiss, Forging Consensus on National Renewables Policy: The 
Renewables Portfolio Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust Fund, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 
1999, at 68, 69. 
118 Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts To Promote Renewable Energy: 
Tripping the Horse with the Cart?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2007, at 5, 5. 
119 The electric utility industry is comprised of three core types of providers: investor-owned 
utilities (“IOUs”), public-owned utilities (“POUs”), and cooperative entities (“co-ops”).  There are far 
fewer IOUs than POUs, but IOUs provide roughly seventy-five percent of the electricity consumed in 
the United States.  All three categories might purchase power from independent power producers 
(“IPPs”). 
120 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(1) (2010). 
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production from each utility, RPSs use RECs as a proxy for their 
production requirement.121  The idea is much like environmental law’s 
pollution trading schemes.122  Parties can use credits to more efficiently 
comply with the RPS.  For example, a utility that produces renewable 
electricity in excess of its RPS obligation can sell the credits it does not 
need to utilities lacking their own renewable facilities.  The result is that 
the purchasing utilities pay only the market price of the energy itself, not 
the presumably higher capital cost of building new facilities.  Either way, 
the total amount of renewable power produced remains the same.  Only the 
parties producing it and the cost of doing so change.  Both should be more 
efficient.123 
Design questions abound on how to implement these two relatively 
straightforward RPS components.  The leading RPS guidebook weighs in 
at well over one hundred pages and chronicles no fewer than two dozen 
key design issues.124  Apart from fitting an RPS into a state’s existing 
regulatory regime, these questions might be reduced to four core RPS 
design traits. 
First is the trait of the RPS’s aspirational aggressiveness.  Is the RPS 
mandatory or voluntary?  That is, does it compel the addition of renewable 
generating facilities, such as in Maine,125 or does it merely push utilities 
toward that goal, such as in Utah?126  Is the RPS’s ultimate target 
                                                                                                                          
121 Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 22. 
122 Pollution trading schemes allow regulated entities to purchase credits for the “right” to pollute 
rather than actually decreasing their pollution.  The idea is not only to reach the same overall total 
amount of pollution, but also to do so more efficiently than if each company had to reduce the same 
share no matter the cost.  See, e.g., SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 104–07 (discussing 
emissions allowances policies); E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest 
Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 247–48, 251–54 (2001) 
(describing aspects of market-based approaches to environmental governance); Robert W. Hahn & 
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 15–19 (1991) (explaining four contexts for incentive-based policies in the United 
States: emissions, lead, water pollution, and water rights); Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The 
Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 37, 80–81 (1998) (concluding that “[e]nvironmental regulation is an excellent example of 
interest group politics mediated through legislative and regulatory processes[,]” which, in the context of 
the Clean Air Act, resulted in “a major long-term program to reduce pollution using an innovative 
tradable emissions permit system”). 
123 See Panel, EBA Climate Change Primer: Financing a Renewable Project, 29 ENERGY L.J. 
195, 204 (2008); Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved the Planet, 36 
CUMB. L. REV. 417, 449 (2006). 
124 NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE (2001), available at http://www.naruc.affiniscape.com/associations/1773/files/rps.pdf; see also 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION: POLICIES, BEST 
PRACTICES, AND ACTION STEPS FOR STATES 5-1 to 5-2 (2006), available at http://www.chs.ubc.ca/ 
archives/files/Clean-Energy-Guide.pdf (listing effective policies for “increasing the amount of clean 
energy supply”); Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 30–31 (explaining that states can pursue numerous 
policy goals when enacting an RPS and explaining that states’ available resources differ, which can 
result in states not having uniform RPS policies). 
125 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 3210-A(3), 3210-C(1)(C)(1) (2009). 
126 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-17-602(1)(a), 54-7-12(2)(c)(ii) (2009). 
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aggressive or lax?  That is, does the RPS mandate a small amount of new 
renewable power, such as Iowa’s 105 megawatt-hour (“MWh”) 
requirement,127 or does it call for a real market transformation, such as 
Hawaii’s dictate of “[f]orty per cent of its net electricity sales by December 
31, 2030”?128 
Second, and in part the flipside of its aspirational aggressiveness, is the 
RPS’s salience distortion.  “Salience distortion” is the term used by 
Professor Christopher Peterson to measure the extent to which regulatory 
tools stretch the truth about—distort—what they say they accomplish and 
what they actually accomplish.129  Although Peterson has used the concept 
in credit markets to show how legislative “limits” on payday loan rates 
often are dozens of times higher than the way the law expresses them,130 
the concept can be used to describe requirements in other areas of the law 
as well.131  It applies here.  Does the RPS require actual renewable energy, 
or does it merely mandate new generation capacity that could go 
unused?132  Does it mandate newly constructed generation, or does it dilute 
its goal by counting existing resources?  Does it apply without exception, 
or does it engage in regulatory puffery by allowing, for instance, double-
counting of some resources133 or the reduction of its mandate for others?134 
Third is the RPS’s market definition.  Because the core RPS objective 
is to incentivize renewable technology, the way in which any state’s RPS 
defines the renewable market is critical.  Is the RPS inclusive or 
restrictive?  That is, does it count as “renewable” only wind, solar, and 
small hydroelectric facilities, or do other new and emerging technologies 
qualify as well?  Does the RPS give credit to renewable energy produced 
anywhere on the grid, or does it limit qualification to in-state sources?  
Does it use a credit mechanism, or does it limit eligibility to owned or 
purchased power? 
                                                                                                                          
127 IOWA CODE § 476.44(2) (2008). 
128 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 269-92(a)(4) (West 2010).  
129 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience 
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1114–15 (2008); see also Daniel 
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
1449, 1468 (2003) (discussing the conclusions of studies regarding the detection of and reaction to the 
misweighting of information); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1131 (1974) (describing “three heuristics that are employed in 
making judgments under uncertainty . . . [which, though] highly economical and usually effective, 
[can] . . . lead to systematic and predictable errors”). 
130 See Peterson, supra note 129, at 1164. 
131 See id. at 1115, 1161 n.223. 
132 See, e.g., TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (Vernon 2010). 
133 Many states give extra credit—sometimes as “set-asides,” sometimes as “multipliers”—for 
certain resources, especially solar.  See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 16. 
134 Some states allow non-renewable resources, such as advanced coal or nuclear, to count.  Many 
also credit efficiency measures.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(IV) (2009) (efficiency); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 56-576, 56-585.2(B) (West 2009) (nuclear). 
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Finally, there is the RPS’s planning and enforcement rigor.  Beyond 
the matter of how high an RPS sets its aim is how well it follows through.  
Does the RPS impose significant enforcement penalties, or is it effectively 
toothless?  If they do comply, what assurance do utilities have that they 
will recoup their costs?  And how is compliance measured over time?  Are 
utilities required to submit advance plans explaining how they intend to 
comply with the RPS, or is regulatory review triggered only once a 
problem emerges? 
C.  Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity 
That so many questions can be raised in the abstract about RPSs’ 
possible design characteristics should foreshadow the prospect of 
incredibly diverse—perhaps even irreconcilable—RPS requirements in the 
concrete.  Indeed, more than one commentator has pointed to this risk of 
hodgepodge regulation as a primary reason for adopting a federal 
standard.135 
The risks presented by such an internally conflicted regime are not, 
however, as straightforward as one initially might think.  Whereas car 
makers long have fought against the possibility of fifty different tailpipe 
emission limits,136 or trucking companies have resisted varying safety 
regulations,137 electricity does not function the same way.  Automobile 
manufacturers need uniform regulation because a vehicle made in 
Kentucky might be sold in Mississippi just as easily as in Maine.  A long-
haul truck traveling from Saginaw to San Francisco likewise cannot 
reasonably be expected to change tires, mirrors, or mud flaps every time it 
crosses the eight state borders along the way.  Electricity is different.  
Although the courts repeatedly have recognized that electrons cannot be 
traced,138 this does not mean that power produced in Miami can be sold in 
Los Angeles.  There are three primary power grids in the United States—
the Texas Interconnect, the Eastern Interconnect, and the Western 
                                                                                                                          
135 See Lunt, supra note 108, at 405; see also Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, 
Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for 
Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 92–94 (2008) (providing examples of various disparate 
state RPS policies). 
136 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 17 F.3d 521, 
524–25 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the auto industry’s preference for preemption of state emissions 
standards by the Clean Air Act); see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, 
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1618 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel 
& Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 224–25 (2005). 
137 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959) (unique mud flaps); 
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763–64 (1945) (train lengths).  
138 See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) 
(recognizing that once energy is placed into the grid, “consumers then draw undifferentiated energy 
from that grid” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light 
Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972) (finding that transmitted electricity constitutes interstate commerce). 
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Interconnect139—and power generally does not flow readily among 
them.140  Thus, it would be most unusual for a California utility, for 
instance, to have a power sales agreement with a counterpart in Florida. 
This fragmentation of the “national” electric grid into multiple parts 
means that, presumptively at least, complaints about regulatory conflicts 
should not be as strong for a national RPS as it is in other industries.  Two 
key factors, however, change that calculus. 
First, even though the national electrical system is not seamless,141 it is 
becoming more so.  FERC’s encouragement of RTOs is one factor driving 
this trend.142  Another is that utilities often serve customers in multiple 
states.  MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company, for instance, has 
subsidiaries that serve customers from Oregon to Illinois and virtually 
every state in between.143  American Electric Power serves 5.2 million 
customers using 38,953 miles of transmission lines in a 197,500 square 
mile service territory that covers parts of Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
West Virginia.144  Even comparatively small El Paso Electric is not limited 
to a single state; it serves both Texas and New Mexico.145  Moreover, some 
commentators believe that this trend of multi-state utilities is only likely to 
increase because the Energy Policy Act of 2005 largely repealed PUHCA, 
which previously had imposed geographic limits on utility mergers.146  
Now that those limits are gone, utilities operating in more than one state 
may well increase—and face the prospect of needing to comply with 
multiple RPSs, a task both costly and inefficient.147 
                                                                                                                          
139 The Texas Interconnect covers most of Texas.  The Eastern Interconnect encompasses part of 
Montana, part of South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, part of Texas, and points east.  The 
Western Interconnect includes the rest of Montana, the rest of South Dakota, Colorado, New Mexico, 
the rest of Texas, and all points west.  U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Interconnections of the North American 
Electric Reliability Council in the Contiguous United States, 1998, http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/ 
page/prim2/fig15.gif (last visited June 17, 2010).  
140 Id.; see also PETER C. CHRISTENSEN, RETAIL WHEELING: A GUIDE FOR END-USERS 21 (2d ed. 
1996); Erich W. Struble, Comment, National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors: Will State 
Regulators Remain Relevant?, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 575, 581 n.32 (2008) (“[T]here is no national 
power grid.”). 
141 See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,464 (Aug. 29, 2002) (noting the difficulty 
of moving power across seams and the different transmission rules that apply to them). 
142 For more on the mechanics of RTO implementation, see generally Clinton A. Vince et al., 
What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2006). 
143 See MidAmerican Energy, About Us: Facts at a Glance, http://www.midamericanenergy.com/ 
aboutus2.aspx (last visited June 17, 2010); Pacificorp, Company Quick Facts, http://www.pacificorp. 
com/about/co/cqf.html (last visited June 17, 2010). 
144 American Electric Power, About Us, http://www.aep.com/about/ (last visited June 17, 2010). 
145 El Paso Electric, Service Territory Map, http://www.epelectric.com (follow “About EPE”; then 
follow “Service Area”) (last visited June 17, 2010). 
146 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1261–1263, 119 Stat. 594, 972–74 (2005). 
147 See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’—A Colorful Approach 
to a U.S. National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.–Sept. 2006, at 19, 22.  But cf. 
Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are 
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Second, even if utilities were not increasingly spanning geographical 
boundaries, the risk of conflicting RPSs would still be problematic.  The 
reason is RECs.  RECs change everything.  With RECs, the lack of 
transmission capacity, or even interconnections, vanish as barriers to RPS 
compliance because the California utility that is short on renewable energy 
no longer needs to buy wind or solar power from Texas or Florida.  
Instead, it could buy an REC from either state, or any other, because RECs 
transform the RPS from a strictly regulatory measure to a financial one.  
They make geography and grids effectively irrelevant.148 
What this means is that the concern over a crazy-quilt RPS regime 
must be different from the concern for non-uniform regulation in other 
industries.  For the RPS, it is only partly about the cost and inefficiency of 
complying with conflicting standards.  It is much more about fostering 
renewables development through an effective and efficient market, a 
market where geography does not matter. 
This is why, in short, complaints that “fifty state-created and controlled 
RPSs” can only create an unwieldy regulatory “patchwork,” with each 
state administering its own program and “duplicating efforts and 
reinventing the wheel each time,”149 are only partially correct.  The real 
critique must focus on RPSs’ real objective: its ability to move renewable 
power forward, to push this “environmental electricity” past the roughly 
ten percent market share it has held since the 1980s.150 
It is this critique, in fact, about markets, not just about regulatory and 
compliance costs, that forms the foundational argument for a federal RPS. 
IV.  THE FEDERAL-STATE RPS DEBATE 
Despite state RPSs’ rapid emergence, no federal mandate has found 
footing.  This is not for a lack of effort.  More than two dozen federal RPS 
                                                                                                                          
Insufficient To Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 338 (2007) (noting 
that “PUHCA’s repeal does not eliminate all regulatory obstacles to utility-related mergers and 
acquisitions”); Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided 
Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 91 n.42 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, Smart Policy] (pointing out that 
state review often is more likely than PUHCA or FPA review to torpedo proposed mergers). 
148 That is, of course, “irrelevant” from the perspective of REC trading.  From the perspective of 
developing new renewables projects, it is well recognized that transmission is a major—and 
important—hurdle to deployment.  E.g., STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2:11 
(2009). 
149 Lunt, supra note 108, at 405; see also Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 
135, at 92–94. 
150 This figure refers to generated electricity.  The percentage is comparable for generation 
capacity.  It would be much lower if hydroelectric were excluded.  See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, 
supra note 22, at 231, 264.  For cumulative energy consumption (not just electricity), renewables 
consistently have comprised less than ten percent of the nation’s consumption.  Today, the percentage 
is actually less than it was in 1949.  See id. at 9. 
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proposals have been introduced in Congress since 1996.151  None has 
passed.  Although the possibility of a federal RPS is increasingly receiving 
more attention, and its odds of adoption seem increasingly likely—an 
amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 providing for a federal RPS 
passed the Senate,152 and a national RPS was part of the Waxman-Markey 
bill that passed the House last year153—the debate over a federal RPS 
continues. 
The debate has centered more on whether there should be a federal 
RPS at all than on what a federal RPS should look like.  One of the 
proposals currently dominating the stage, in structure, is not much different 
from many state initiatives.  It would set a twenty percent renewable target 
by 2021, with this mandate gradually escalating over time.154  It would 
define eligible renewable power to include wind, solar, geothermal, 
renewable biomass, and certain hydroelectric sources.155  It would apply to 
any retail electric supplier that sells 4,000,000 or more MWh of electricity 
per year.156  It would establish a credit system.157  And it would give 
enforcement responsibility to FERC.158  So far at least, none of these 
details has been the bill’s, or its predecessors’, chief hang-up. 
Instead, scholars and law makers have criticized the possibility of a 
federal RPS on many fronts, including its potential economic effects, its 
alleged inefficiency as a regulatory tool, and its intrusion into areas of 
historical state jurisdiction.  For their part, RPS proponents have argued for 
renewables’ environmental benefits, the likelihood of green collar jobs 
from renewables development, and the growing need for energy 
independence and security.  Together, these clashing views focus the 
                                                                                                                          
151 Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need To Mandate Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 n.11 (2006).  For an account of early national RPS proposals, see 
James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 131–86 (2004). 
152 Ralls, supra note 151, at 452–53 n.11 (discussing S. Amend. 791, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
153 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009) 
(proposing to add § 610, a provision for a “Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity Standard,” 
to PURPA). 
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 See id. (proposing to amend PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 2601, by adding § 610(a)(18)(A)–(B)).  In 
2001, the average annual U.S. household electricity consumption was 10.66 MWh.  See ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY REPORT, at tbl.US-1 (2005),  
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/enduse/er01_us_tab1.html. For comparison purposes, 
publicly-owned utilities (e.g., municipals) sold only 14.7% of the electricity in the United States in 
2000, but every one of the top ten POUs sold more than 4,000,000 MWh.  See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF MAJOR U.S. PUBLICLY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
2000, at 4 tbl.1, 12 tbl.3 (2001), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/043700.pdf.  
Investor-owned utilities sold 75.6% of the electricity consumed that year.  Id. at 4 tbl.1. 
157 H.R. 2454, § 101(a). 
158 Id. § 553(b)(2).  A similar proposal is contained in S. 1462, the bill that would be the 
American Clean Energy Leadership Act (“ACELA”).  See id. § 132(a) (proposing a fifteen percent RPS 
for all electric utilities “that sell[] electricity to electric consumers for a purpose other than resale”). 
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federal-state RPS debate on three core issues: (1) a federal RPS’s likely 
effect on renewable energy markets; (2) its probable jurisdictional impact; 
and (3) its “real,” or direct, environmental, economic, and security benefits 
and costs.159 
A.  Renewable Energy Markets 
The argument for a federal RPS that receives the least attention is the 
one that may be most important.  A national standard is necessary to make 
the renewables market more liquid, transparent, and uniform.  Christopher 
Berendt makes the case: 
The need for a fluid national [renewables] market has long 
been recognized by industry and investors alike.  Renewable 
energy . . . has high initial capital costs.  Thus, it is essential 
that . . . investors have reliable information regarding levels 
of return from the start of the financing process . . . . 
Liquidity for most investment instruments is enabled by two 
core factors: (1) a trusted exchange; and (2) a sufficient 
trading volume across that exchange.  Currently, neither of 
these factors [are] present . . . .160 
The point is that without a national RPS, what counts as “renewable” 
in one state might not count in another.  There is no such thing as a 
fungible “renewable energy product” today because “renewable” has been 
defined so many different ways.  State RPSs’ different definitions render 
renewable energy less fungible across political boundaries.  Thus, the value 
of renewable power may turn just as much on how a state’s law reads as on 
the product’s salient economic features.  A national RPS, these advocates 
urge, is needed because a fractured market will not adequately spur 
renewable technology development, but a national market would.  As 
Senator Jeff Bingaman has argued, “There is one thing, however, that a 
State standard will not do—it cannot drive a national market for the 
technologies . . . .”161 
The corollary to this argument is that a federal RPS is needed not only 
to increase market uniformity, but also to increase the total amount of 
renewable energy production.  It is, no doubt, laudable that so many states 
have adopted RPSs.  But those laws reach only as far as their states’ 
borders.  If the entire nation—instead of seventy percent of it—is subject 
                                                                                                                          
159 Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 54, 64 (2006). 
160 Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid National Market for 
Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 54–55 (emphasis 
added). 
161 153 CONG. REC. S7582, S7598 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). 
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to an RPS, the aggregate market size for renewables will increase, or at 
least it will if the federal requirement is set sufficiently high.162  For a 
policy that holds as its primary objective increased renewables 
deployment, this is critical.  For emerging markets, especially, size 
matters.163 
The common counterpoint to these arguments is double-pronged.  
First, a federal RPS would duplicate pro-renewables efforts.  Second, it 
would unfairly create regional “winners” and “losers.”164 
Mary Ann Ralls makes the first point.  She contends that the sundry 
state RPSs and various renewable energy purchasing programs and tax and 
financial incentives “supplant” the need for a federal RPS.165  Professor 
Robert Michaels sounds a similar refrain.  Observing that the RPS “is only 
one element of a climate conducive to renewable investment,” he argues 
that there are better ways to incent technology development.166  “‘Infant 
industry’ justifications for supporting renewables development through an 
RPS are mostly self-serving politics, and in the event public intervention is 
warranted the RPS is a poor instrument for the job.”167 
Politicians tend to make the second, “winners and losers” argument 
most vociferously.168  The allegation is simple:  A federal RPS “amounts to 
a wealth transfer” because renewables-poor states will be forced to buy 
energy and RECs from renewables-rich states.169  “[O]ne shoe should not 
fit every State.  States . . . can’t do this because of the unfortunate situation 
of nature . . . . [These States] should not be [compelled] . . . to pay a very 
big tax . . . .”170  As a result, one design feature that has been a sticking 
point for federal proposals is the definition of “renewable.”  Advocates of 
nuclear, coal, and other technologies, including states rich in these 
resources, have played the climate change card to cast the RPS as focused 
too narrowly on renewables.171  “I believe very strongly [that] emission-
free nuclear power has simply got to be part of the equation,” Senator Lisa 
                                                                                                                          
162 This is a critical point, because a too-low federal RPS would add nothing if set below the 
cumulative mandate of existing state laws.  See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
163 Adam B. Jaffe et al., Technological Change and the Environment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 461, 490 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003). 
164 Fershee, supra note 23, at 59. 
165 Ralls, supra note 151, at 456–58. 
166 Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 109. 
167 Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 10. 
168 Fershee, supra note 23, at 59. 
169 Id. 
170 151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6680 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Domenici).  
171 See Fershee, supra note 23, at 59–60; Ralls, supra note 151, at 453–54; Benjamin K. Sovacool 
& Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 36 (2008). 
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Murkowski recently declared.172  “If the goal is to reduce emissions, why 
we would not include nuclear . . . is just beyond me.”173 
B.  Jurisdiction 
A secondary argument in favor of a federal RPS is that it would 
eliminate jurisdictional problems created by a multi-state scheme.  Most 
prominent are Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.  Even though the 
Commerce Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution,174 as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in its “negative” or “dormant” aspect, 
forecloses state protectionism of local resources and businesses,175 a 
number of state RPSs favor in-state renewable resources.  Arizona, for 
instance, gives extra compliance credit to utilities that use certain facilities 
installed or built in the state.176  And Ohio flatly preferences in-state 
resources:  “At least one-half of the renewable energy resources [required 
by this RPS] shall be met through facilities located in this state . . . .”177  
Commentators have pointed to this trend, alternately, as rendering state 
RPSs “constitutionally questionable” and as “the most compelling legal 
argument” for a national RPS.178 
Related to state RPSs’ Dormant Commerce Clause dilemma is the 
problem of regulatory “leakage.”179  Leakage is a “common challenge” for 
policies aimed at social ills.180  When, for instance, a state heightens 
pollution limits or a municipality ramps up drug enforcement, polluters and 
drug sellers may simply “relocate to other jurisdictions” to continue their 
activities.181  This phenomenon is known in the environmental arena as the 
                                                                                                                          
172 Katherine Ling, Senate Committee Repels Effort To Strike Renewable Provision, GREENWIRE, 
May 21, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/05/21/2/. 
173 Id. 
174 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
175 E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 
(1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 
272 (1984); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).  
176 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D), (E) (2008). 
177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2000). 
178 Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 125–26; Brian E. Maxted, 
Note, Developing Wind Power in the Commonwealth: No Longer a Quixotic Quest To Build Wind 
Farms in Virginia, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 338 (2008); see also Kirsten H. 
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case 
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 316 (1999); Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans: 
Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 52, 55–60; 
Patrick Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States 
Can Stop Worrying and Learn To Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1096–
1107 (2006). 
179 Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,653, 10,654 (2007). 
180 Id. at 10,655. 
181 Id. 
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“race-to-the-bottom” because it can encourage neighboring jurisdictions to 
regulate less stringently.182 
Leakage, however, also can be a problem for policies that do not 
attempt to eliminate social evils but instead seek to attract socially 
beneficial activities.  In the case of renewable energy, if Missouri, for 
example, adopted an RPS but Tennessee, Arkansas, and Nebraska did not, 
the risk would be that Missouri’s law would fail to change the market.  The 
total amount of renewable generation might not increase—or would not 
increase as much as Missouri sought—because rather than building their 
own facilities, Missouri utilities would import power from existing 
generators in surrounding states.183  This may well be some states’ 
rationale for favoring in-state renewables, despite the constitutional 
problems of doing so.184  A federal RPS, however, solves both problems.  
It removes the need—perceived or real—for state protectionism.  And, as 
long as the standard is set high enough,185 a federal RPS compels a total net 
increase in renewables. 
The main rebuttal to these jurisdictional arguments is the claim that a 
federal requirement would intrude on state authority.  To be sure, the 
“[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and 
services, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the 
States.”186  It is, in fact, the structure the FPA ensures,187 and on this basis, 
voices against a federal RPS have been loud indeed.  Commenting on the 
proposed Energy Policy Act of 2005, the White House declared:  “The 
Administration would oppose . . . a national renewable portfolio 
standard . . . and believes these standards are best left to the States.  A 
national RPS could raise consumer costs, especially in areas where these 
resources are less abundant and harder to cultivate or distribute.”188  More 
recently, the National Association of Manufacturers and the electric utility 
industry’s trade association, the Edison Electric Institute, issued a joint 
press release urging the same point.  “[S]tates and their utilities—not the 
                                                                                                                          
182 Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It 
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278–85 (1997) (arguing that a race-to-the-bottom exists, 
resulting in reduction of state welfare and a need for federal regulation), with Richard L. Revesz, The 
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
535, 538–40 (1997) (challenging the race-to-the-bottom theory as a need for federal regulation). 
183 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1532 (2007). 
184 Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and 
Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal 
Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 264–68 (2008). 
185 See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
186 Pac. Gas & Electricity Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
205 (1983). 
187 For a discussion on the FPA, see supra Part II.B. 
188 Statement of Administration Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, 
H.R. 6—Energy Policy Act of 2005 (June 14, 2005), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=24834. 
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federal government—should be allowed to make their own fuel choices . . . 
. If ever there was a case in which one size doesn’t fit all, this is it . . . .”189  
Members of Congress likewise have argued that a national RPS would be 
“in the spirit of an unfunded Federal mandate, the kind of thing that a lot of 
us were elected to stop, the idea of coming up with a big idea here in 
Washington and imposing it on the rest of the country.”190 
C.  Benefits and Costs 
Despite the breadth of contentions for and against a federal RPS, 
arguments over the proposal’s likely benefits and costs have dominated the 
scene.  Proponents insist a national RPS will deliver on all its 
environmental, economic, and security promises without deleterious price 
impacts.  RPS opponents, on the other hand, contend that there are more 
effective ways to advance RPS goals, that its promises are empty, and that 
it will impose unnecessary, exorbitant price hikes on consumers.  “It is 
hard to imagine any environmental policy,” Professor Michaels contends, 
“that delivers as little in theory as a national RPS, [especially when] the 
experiences of the states show that it delivers equally little in practice as 
well.”191 
1.  Environmental 
Key among the federal RPS’s offered benefits are its potential 
environmental effects.  As Senator Jim Jeffords has argued, “A renewables 
requirement would dramatically reduce carbon emissions from 
powerplants.  It would also significantly reduce emissions of sulfur and 
nitrogen oxides.  These pollutants contaminate our water, cause smog and 
acid rain, and contribute to respiratory illnesses.”192  Other commentators 
are even more emphatic.  “[A] national RPS would be designed primarily 
to correct market distortions.”193  It would eliminate the “environmental 
and social costs associated with the mining, processing, transportation, 
combustion and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels.”194  Water 
consumption should decrease,195 as should overall pollution.  “There is 
simply no logical way to crunch the numbers such that renewable 
generation induced by a national RPS would not decrease pollutants from 
                                                                                                                          
189 Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. & Edison Elec. Inst., U.S. Manufacturers and Electric 
Companies Remain Firmly United Against Federal ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard,’ (Aug. 2, 2007), 
available at http://www.eei.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Press%20Releases/070802.pdf. 
190 151 CONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Alexander). 
191 Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 10. 
192 151 CONG. REC. S6682 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Jeffords). 
193 Christopher Cooper, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just 
Plain Correct?, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 9, 10. 
194 Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 127. 
195 Id. at 127–28. 
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levels they would otherwise be in the absence of renewables.”196 
Opponents of a federal RPS do not contend that the law will fail to 
yield environmental benefits.  Rather, they argue that there are more 
efficient—and effective—ways of pursuing the goal.  Professor Michaels 
has been most vocal on this front, though others also have sounded the 
alarm.197 
Michaels claims that a national RPS will “reduce[] emissions at higher 
cost than necessary” for two reasons.198  First, he argues that renewables 
will not create a “one-for-one” reduction in air pollution because 
renewable generation does not run as often as conventional facilities.199  
Utilities typically dispatch generation in “merit order,” meaning that they 
run the least expensive generation first, taking into account operational 
considerations that may limit that preference.200  Renewables thus are more 
likely to displace natural gas-fired generators than, say, coal plants, 
because natural gas facilities typically price higher in the generation stack 
than coal or nuclear.201  Second, Michaels finds RPSs inefficient for failing 
to treat energy efficiency measures “symmetrically” with the addition of 
renewables.202  Demand-side measures like efficiency improvements 
reduce just as much pollution as renewables but cost less because no new 
facility has to be built.  Michaels thus sees RPSs’ failure to promote 
efficiency as a key design flaw.203 
The companion of these claims is the view that other tools can promote 
renewables better than an RPS.  Here, the primary contender is the so-
called “feed-in tariff,” which numerous European and other nations have 
adopted.204  The feed-in tariff is effectively the RPS’s mirror image.  
Rather than using the stick of a minimum renewables threshold, the feed-in 
tariff employs the carrot of a guaranteed price and, often, a purchase 
                                                                                                                          
196 Christopher Cooper & Benjamin K. Sovacool, All Flash, No Light: The Kabuki Dance 
Opposing a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2008, at 41, 46. 
197 See id. at 46. 
198 Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 81. 
199 Id. at 87.  The percentage of time that a generation facility runs is referred to as the facility’s 
“capacity factor.”  Most renewable resources, and especially solar and wind, have lower capacity 
factors than “baseload” facilities, such as nuclear and coal, that tend to run all the time because they are 
needed to meet minimum system demand.  In 2007, the average capacity factor for nuclear plants was 
91.8%; for coal, 73.6%; for natural gas combined cycle, 42%; for hydroelectric conventional, 36.3%; 
and for other renewables, 40%.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER 
ANNUAL 2008, at tbl.5.2 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. 
200 Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1297 (1999). 
201 See Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 86–87. 
202 Id. at 87. 
203 Id. at 84. 
204 See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-In Tariffs To Meet U.S. 
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 73–74 (“As of January 2007, eighteen 
European Union countries, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, and Turkey, along with several states and provinces, had adopted feed-in tariffs.”). 
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obligation.205 Under the former German program Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, 
for instance, renewable generators selling their power into the wholesale 
market were guaranteed a price of ninety percent of the retail rate.206  This 
kind of price stability has given feed-in tariff advocates room to argue that 
these tools are more effective than RPSs in achieving renewables 
deployment because they eliminate investor risk.207  “Because the [feed-in 
tariff] ties the payment to a particular project, the risk is removed for that 
project.  Because the [RPS] ties the payment to an amount of generation, 
projects carry risks in terms of price, volume and market for all 
generators.”208 
2.  Security 
RPSs’ asserted security benefits are twofold—one systematic, one 
sociopolitical.  The potential systematic benefit is improved infrastructure 
reliability.209  This may follow from the mere addition of renewables into 
the generation mix.  By definition, a more diverse energy portfolio should 
be more reliable than a homogenous one because there are more, and 
different, resources to replace an offline generator.210  Moreover, because 
of their smaller size, it should be easier to fill in for renewables generators 
                                                                                                                          
205 See id. at 73 (“[F]eed-in tariffs require utilities to provide renewable generators with a long-
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EU MEMBER STATES 1 (2005), available at http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
Miguel/Ragwitz_monitor_pol_instr.pdf (“The effectiveness of the promotion of innovative 
technologies like wind energy, agricultural biogas and photovoltaics has been the highest in countries 
having feed-in tariffs as their main support system, even though not all feed-in countries are equally 
successful.”); Paul Gipe, Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms 56 (Feb. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Gipe_RE_Policy_Mechs.pdf (“Both 
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208 C. Mitchell et al., Risk, Innovation and Market Rules: A Comparison of the Renewable 
Obligation in England and Wales and the Feed-In System in Germany 20, available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Bauknecht_Mitchell_Connor__2002
__Risk__Innovation_and_Market_Rules_-_A_Comparison_of_the_RO_and_the_EEG.pdf; see also 
NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 417 (2006) (“Both sets of 
instruments have proved effective but existing experience favours price-based support 
mechanisms . . . . Central to this is the assurance of long-term price guarantees.”); Janet L. Sawin, 
National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons for the Advancement & Diffusion of Renewable Energy 
Technologies Around the World 27 (Int’l Conference for Renewable Energies Conference Thematic 
Background Paper, 2004), available at http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/tbp/TBP03-policies.pdf. 
209 See, e.g., Fershee, supra note 23, at 66–68; Maxted, supra note 178, at 337–38; Sovacool & 
Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 112–18; see also 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(7) (2006) 
(discussing the statutory regulations that utility companies must follow).  
210 Sovacool & Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’, supra note 147, at 27; see also Sovacool & Cooper, 
State Efforts, supra note 118, at 6–7 (noting that renewables-based generators require less downtime 
for maintenance and repairs than conventional power plants). 
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that go offline.  Then-Senator Barack Obama touted this attribute of 
renewables from a terrorism perspective: “Introducing renewable 
electricity . . . brings us a measure of physical security . . . [namely], 
smaller targets and reduc[ed] transport of combustible materials.”211 
The other oft-cited security benefit of renewables is in many ways the 
Holy Grail of American energy policy: energy independence.  The idea is 
obvious.  If we can use renewables to abandon fossil fuels, we can gain 
self-sufficiency rather than importing over a quarter of our national energy 
supply from politically unstable, oligopolist states.212  It is the follow-
through on this simple aim that has proven more problematic.  Politicians 
have long touted energy independence as the rationale for a host of energy 
policies,213 yet we remain woefully short of the target.214  Now, with a 
proposed national RPS on the table, the rationale has reemerged.  “[W]e 
are talking about whether we can get the United States to energy 
independence,” then-Senator Ken Salazar implored, “whether we can set 
America free from being held hostage to the importation of foreign oil 
from Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia . . . .”215 
In response to these professed security advances, RPS naysayers point 
to practicalities.  They argue that mass renewables deployment will make 
the electricity system less reliable, because more important than 
diversification is renewables’ Achilles’ heel—their “non-dispatchability.”  
System operators cannot turn renewables-based generators on and off as 
they can with some fossil-fired units, because the sun, wind, and waters 
cannot be tamed.216  This, they say, means less reliability, not more.  They 
                                                                                                                          
211 151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6690 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama); see also 
AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY 264–69, 284–89 (1982); Cooper, supra note 193, at 15 (arguing that renewables may help 
ease transmission siting); Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 33, 43; Sovacool & Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’, supra note 
147, at 27 (contending that renewables benefit society by subjecting the utility industry to fewer “fuel 
interruptions and shortages”). 
212 The Energy Information Administration estimates that in 2008 the United States consumed 
99.481 quadrillion Btus of primary energy and had net imports of 25.936 quadrillion Btus.  The vast 
majority of imports are oil, natural gas, and petroleum products.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 tbl.1.1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
mer/pdf/mer.pdf. 
213 See, e.g., Davies, Energy Policy, supra note 106, at 78. 
214 For commentary on the idea of energy independence as impractical, unachievable, and 
inefficient, see, for instance, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 
ENVTL. L. 595, 596 (2007); John J. Fialka, Energy Independence: A Dry Hole?, WALL ST. J., July 5, 
2006, at A4; Tom Kenworthy, Energy Independence May Be a Pipe Dream, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 
2004, at 17A. 
215 151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6684 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Salazar); see also 
153 CONG. REC. E1788 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky); 153 CONG. REC. 
E311 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2007) (statement of Rep. Udall); 153 CONG REC. S7680, S7689 (daily ed. June 
14, 2007) (statement of Rep. Cantwell); 153 CONG. REC. S7582, S7597 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) 
(statement of Sen. Bingaman); Ralls, supra note 151, at 471. 
216 Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges To Accommodate New 
Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 986–96 (2009); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of 
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note that moving to renewables demands huge investments in a new 
transmission system, because areas where renewables are found are so 
disperse.217  And, they contend that focusing on renewables as a cure to the 
United States’ foreign oil addiction is myopic for failing to take advantage 
of other domestically available energy sources such as nuclear, coal, and 
Alaska oil, among others.218 
3.  Economic 
Perhaps the most tested battleground over a national RPS’s wisdom is 
its likely economic effects.219  Both advocates and opponents come heavily 
armed to the debate.  The result, a virtual cacophony of data:  “[A] 15% 
[RPS] would save the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors $16.3 
billion in electricity and natural gas costs.”220  But a national RPS would be 
“an $18 billion new tax on ratepayers to build tens of thousands of 
windmills and to spend $11 billion on solar power, which would produce 
one-fifth of 1% of all the electricity we need by 2025.”221  A 15% RPS, 
however, would “result in a savings in variable costs for electricity of $240 
billion by 2026”—“far more than offsetting the $134 billion increase in 
capital expenditures” it would require.222  Yet, it would increase 
“electricity prices by . . . $12.8 billion . . . by 2030,”223 “rais[ing] our taxes, 
[raising] our electric rates, [running] away jobs, [and ruining] our 
mountaintops.  That is not the kind of choice we like to have.”224 
The basis of RPS proponents’ claims is that shifting to renewables can 
save money in a number of ways—namely, by lowering natural gas prices 
through reduced demand, by replacing conventional generation with 
renewable capital investments that are cheaper “over the expected lifetimes 
of the plants,” and, eventually, by lowering renewable energy’s own cost 
through technology advancement and economies of scale.225  According to 
one study, these impacts, taken together, could lead to consumer savings of 
between $27 and $49.1 billion by 2020 under a 20% national RPS, and 
                                                                                                                          
Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1041–42 (2009); see also 
Gunnar Birgisson & Erik Petersen, Renewable Energy Development Incentives: Strengths, Weaknesses 
and the Interplay, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2006, at 40, 42 (noting the nondispatchable nature of wind as 
an impediment to renewables development). 
217 Fershee, supra note 23, at 67–68; Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 12; Robert J. 
Michaels, Renewable Portfolio Standards: Still No Good Reasons, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2008, at 18, 
20; see also Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479, 1493–94 (2008) (noting 
transmission development as a barrier to renewables).  
218 151 CONG. REC. S6671, S6682 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Domenici). 
219 Fershee, supra note 23, at 73. 
220 153 CONG. REC. S7594 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reed). 
221 151 CONG. REC. S6677 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Alexander). 
222 153 CONG. REC. S7598 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). 
223 153 CONG. REC. S7611 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Voinovich). 
224 153 CONG. REC. S7506 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Alexander). 
225 Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 38. 
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between $22.6 and $37.7 billion by 2025 under a 10% mandate.226  This is 
on top of a projected net increase of 157,480 jobs under a 20% 
requirement, or 91,220 jobs under a 10% mandate.227 
Others, however, take issue with these claims.  They argue that the 
models used to estimate such economic paybacks are flawed, that they 
ignore the significant transmission costs of new renewables facilities, that 
using regulation to force on society technologies that cannot cut it on their 
own in the market is akin to “throwing away part of the labor force,” and 
that the more likely outcome is not more jobs for America, but imported 
cheap labor from overseas.228 
Ultimately, the problem with the assertions of both national RPS 
backers and dissenters is that they must rely on assumptions—projections 
and estimates, not actual evidence.  “Since 1997, at least 18 studies have 
been completed on various [federal] RPS scenarios.”229  Not one, however, 
has been able to examine real world outcomes, a world in which a national 
RPS applies. 
V.  THE FEDERAL-STATE EVIDENCE (SO FAR) 
Although the impact of a federal RPS remains academic, experience 
with state measures provides a hard, if partial, record on which to weigh 
the possibility of taking the RPS national.  The record yields three key 
observations.  State measures have in fact severely fragmented the 
renewables market by using widely differing eligibility criteria and, more 
problematically, limitations on RECs.  State RPSs also erect 
geographically-based renewables trade barriers at an alarming rate.  
Finally, state RPSs have varied widely in both their delivered benefits and 
costs, and in their design. 
In short, if a national RPS is well-designed,230 it may have much to 
offer by eliminating the regulatory complexity the state-based regime has 
produced.  Although many anti-federal RPS arguments focus on whether 
there should be RPSs at all, the reality is that most states already have such 
laws in place.  As a practical matter, the real question thus becomes 
whether a new federal regime or the de facto state milieu will better carry 
out the RPS’s objectives.  A federal law would better advance the primary 
RPS goal of creating a robust, liquid market for renewables, and it may 
also better deliver the environmental, security, and economic benefits that 
RPSs potentially offer. 
This Part assesses the record of state RPS performance thus far.  It uses 
                                                                                                                          
226 Id. at 39. 
227 Id. at 42. 
228 See, e.g., Michaels, Politically Correct, supra note 4, at 13–14, 16–18. 
229 Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 35. 
230 See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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a trio of tools, one existing and two new, to do so.  The new tools are a 
thirty-six-jurisdiction survey of state RPSs that was performed for this 
Article231 and the application of a four-dimensional original metric for 
measuring RPS design.  The metric works by taking each of the RPS 
design attributes delineated above232 and scoring the attributes on a scale of 
0 to 5.  Blended in with these two new methodologies is the existing tool, 
available data on state RPS effects. 
A.  Renewable Energy Markets 
States generally agree that most of what might be called the “core” 
renewable resources count toward their RPSs.  Thus, all thirty-six states 
surveyed give credit for wind, biomass, methane, and photovoltaic solar 
generators, and virtually all—thirty-five of thirty-six—give credit for 
thermal solar generation.  After that, however, uniformity withers.  Only 
twenty-nine states count geothermal as a qualifying renewable resource, 
only twenty-three accept ocean and tidal energy, and a mere thirteen count 
renewables-based cogeneration.233  In other words, although the existing 
state-based RPS regime creates common ground for many renewables, it 
also clearly advantages some technologies over others—ensuring that there 















                                                                                                                          
231 The survey reviewed state RPS statutes and, in some cases, implementing regulations.  It is 
current through October 2009.  The Appendices summarize the survey; the full data are on file with 
author. 
232 See supra Part II.B. 
233 See infra Appendix A.  Treatment of cogenerators is difficult.  Cogeneration admittedly is an 
efficiency, rather than renewable, technology.  It is included as a measure of market definition because 
a number of states specifically contemplate that renewables may be co-fired with other materials, often 
in cogeneration facilities.  Nevertheless, because cogeneration is primarily an efficiency technology, 
the efficacy tendency scoring metric also takes RPSs’ inclusion of cogeneration into account in 
measuring salience distortion.  See infra Appendix F. 
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This lack of uniformity becomes even more apparent when states’ 
treatment of specific resources is considered.  A number of states—no less 
than sixteen—give “credit multipliers” to certain renewables, thus 
preferencing those resources over others.234  The rationale for this approach 
is to help spark the chosen technologies’ development.235  Whether such an 
approach is justified, however, is immaterial to the key federal-state 
question: product uniformity.  Thus, when Virginia, for instance, gives 
“double” the normal RPS credit for solar and wind facilities, those 
resources suddenly assume enhanced value, and an uneven playing field 
emerges.236  Indeed, many of these credit multipliers are significant.  
Colorado gives triple credit for solar energy, Delaware allows a 350% 
credit for off-shore wind, Utah affords a 240% multiplier for in-state solar 
facilities, and Arizona offers multiple bonuses that can be added up to 
double credit based on facility installation date and type.237 
A similar phenomenon has developed with respect to hydroelectricity.  
Every RPS state counts hydroelectric power, but the restrictions and 
limitations on this resource are so varied that there simply is no uniform 
“RPS-eligible” hydroelectric product.  Arizona requires post-2005 facilities 
to be 10 MW or less.238  California allows facilities under 30 MW that do 
                                                                                                                          
234 See infra Appendix B. 
235 Rickerson et al., supra note 204, at 82. 
236 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(C) (2007). 
237 See infra Appendix B. 
238 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §§ R14-2-1802(A)(4)(a)–(b), (9)(a)–(c) (2008). 
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not impact “instream beneficial use.”239  Maine credits facilities under 100 
MW.240  And so on. 
Nor has the state RPS regime created a uniform renewable energy 
credit scheme.  Rather, although virtually all state RPSs provide for REC 
use, their implementation varies even more widely than their definitions of 
“renewable.”241  This is important because RECs are what can make the 
renewables market most functional.  Their very purpose is to enhance 
efficiency by (1) creating a larger, more liquid market and (2) giving 
electricity providers greater options for compliance.  However, while many 
states specify that one REC equals one MWh of renewables-generated 
electricity,242 at least three define an REC as one kilowatt-hour of 
electricity.243  This is akin to saying that a dime found in Arizona can be 
exchanged for $100 in Texas.244  Making matters worse, states give their 
RECs different shelf lives.245  Some states, like Arizona, put no expiration 
date on their RECs.  Others, like Colorado, give them somewhat longer 
shelf lives, five years for instance.  In between, the array of choices is 
wide.246  Add the fact that what qualifies as “renewable” in the first place 
already varies, and that different regions have begun developing different 
REC-tracking platforms,247 and the lack of uniformity across jurisdictions 





                                                                                                                          
239 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(c)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2010). 
240 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 3210(2)(C)(2)(f) (2009). 
241 Hawaii’s statute does not utilize RECs, for perhaps obvious reasons.  New York currently does 
not allow credit use, and Iowa’s law merely authorizes state regulators to “establish or participate” in 
an REC program.  See IOWA CODE § 476.44a (2008); N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing 
New RPS Goal and Resolving Main Tier Issues, Case 03-E-0188, at 24 (Jan. 8, 2010), available at 
http://documents.dps.state.ny.us/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={30CFE590-E7E1-473B-
A648-450A39E80F48}. 
242 E.g., 723-3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 3652(n) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 352(16) (2009). 
243 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1803(A) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.78215(1) (2009); N.M. 
STAT. § 62-16-5(A) (2009). 
244 Obviously, a kind of “exchange rate” system could easily solve such a problem.  That the 
problem exists, however, underscores the effect that different RPS requirements have on a uniform 
REC market. 
245 Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 23. 
246 See infra Appendix C.  Some statutory RPSs do not specify shelf lives for RECs; some also 
leave it to the discretion of the implementing agency.  The Michigan PSC, for instance, has proposed a 
three-year shelf life for RECs in that state, but that rulemaking remains open as this Article goes to 
press.  See In re Rules Governing Renewable Energy Plans and Energy Optimization Plans, 2010 WL 
1820876 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 27, 2010) (proposing Rule 460.224, which would mandate 
that RECs “shall not be available for compliance retirement for any month later than 36 months after 
the month in which the credits were generated”).  Figure 2 excludes such states. 
247 See Fershee, supra note 23, at 69–70 (discussing ISO and RTO tracking systems for RECs); 
see also Lori Bird & Elizabeth Lokey, Interaction of Compliance and Voluntary Renewable Energy 
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 18, 20–21. 
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Indeed, one recent study concluded that state RPSs have “fragmented” 
the REC market.248  REC prices vary “substantially across regions and 
resource types” because of differing “resource eligibility rules,” supply 
perceptions, “and/or hoarding of [credits] by some parties.”249  A national 
RPS should ameliorate these effects.  A uniform REC market would 
replace the fractured one that exists today.  Then, when one area lacked 
sufficient renewable energy at any given time, it could purchase available 
credits from another.250  In other words, a more economically efficient 
equilibrium should occur.  Federal competition should not just make REC 
prices more uniform; it should drive them down.251 
B.  Jurisdiction 
The evidence weighs even more clearly in favor of a national RPS 
from a jurisdictional perspective.  State RPSs include a surprising number 
of geographic limits on eligible generation.  More than three-quarters of 
RPS states impose some kind of geographic limitation on generation 
eligibility: thirty-one of the thirty-six RPS states, or eighty-six percent. 
To be fair, not all of these restrictions are equally onerous.  Some 
                                                                                                                          
248 See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 26. 
249 Id. at 27–28. 
250 See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 107. 
251 See Pallab Mozumder & Achla Marathe, Gains from an Integrated Market for Tradable 
Renewable Energy Credits, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259, 270 (2004). 
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confine eligible power sources only to the state’s region, obviously much 
less troublesome than a limit that cuts eligibility off at the state border.252  
A number of states, such as Ohio and Illinois, impose a flat preference for 
in-state power, while others, such as Minnesota and New Mexico, take a 
weaker approach, merely encouraging RPS implementation with an eye 
toward state-centered benefits.253  Still others take a less direct approach 
that has the same practical effect as a flat preference: awarding credit 
multipliers to facilities, or certain facility classes, located in-state.254  No 
matter which way states structure their preferences, however, the outcome 
is the same.  RPSs that favor in-state or in-region generation splinter the 
market and stunt trade.  They limit renewables’ overall value by making 
them worth less in one jurisdiction than another, and they diminish the 
national commitment to renewables by curbing their trade. 
 




The effect of these geographic limits is amplified by their application 
to RECs as well.  At least eighteen states do this, with ten restraining REC 
use or eligibility by their local region, and eight more either giving extra 
weight to RECs derived from in-state power or restricting REC use to their 
states’ boundaries.255  But limiting where RECs can be used risks gutting 
                                                                                                                          
252 Endrud, supra note 184, at 272–73. 
253 See infra Appendix D. 
254 See id. 
255 States that limit or modify REC value by region include California, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, as well as the 
District of Columbia.  See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(c), (f) (West 2010); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 
25741(b) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a(b) (2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1431(10), 34-
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the mechanism’s very purpose: to harness the market to make RPSs more 
efficient, not less. 
Indeed, virtually every state that imposes geographic limits on RPS 
qualification has potential trading partners in its immediate neighbors.  
Yet, quite troublingly, these states have erected geographic barriers 
nevertheless.  All but one state with an in-state preference—Delaware—
border a non-RPS state.  And all but three of these states border two or 
more non-RPS states.256  This implies that state RPSs’ geographic limits 
likely restrain trade, because without those limits, developers might find it 
more cost-efficient to build a facility, for instance, just inside Wyoming’s 
non-RPS border and transmit the power into the Colorado RPS market.257  
Thus, states’ geographic restrictions put their RPSs at war with themselves.  
By seeking to prevent leakage on their percentage targets, they undermine 






                                                                                                                          
1432 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-701(i), 7-703(d) (LexisNexis 2010); 225 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 14.07(2)(c) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV) (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 
14:8-2.8(c), 14:8-2.9 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.145 (2010); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1648.3(e), 
1648.4 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2010).  States that do so on the basis of the REC’s 
production in-state include Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, 
Utah, and West Virginia.  See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
26, § 356 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039(2)(d)–(e) (West 2010); N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 
17.9.572.13(C)(2) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-5(c) (2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-17-603(6)(a) (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2F-4(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2010). 
256 Compare DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/ 
RPS_map.ppt, with National Public Radio, Visualizing the U.S. Electric Grid, http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=110997398 (last visited June 17, 2010) (visually comparing states 
that have RPSs with transmission lines).  A more sophisticated assessment of these geographic barriers’ 
effect on REC trading is an area for further study.  Examining transmission paths—and available 
transmission capacity—would be a necessary part of such an undertaking.  Here, a more simplified 
approach of geographic boundaries, rather than transmission interconnections, was used.  In this tally, 
states with voluntary RPSs were counted as “non-RPS” states for leakage purposes, because a state 
with a non-binding goal presumably should be comparably more willing to trade power into a state 
with a mandatory RPS.  Such states, however, are also counted as “RPS states” for purposes of 
counting those states with geographic restraints on trade, because their non-binding RPSs should create 
at least some pull on renewable-based power into their borders. 
257 Wyoming does not currently have an RPS, and Colorado grants 1.25 RECs (rather than 1 
REC) for energy generated in-state.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(III) (2009); see also DSIRE: 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards (June 2010), 
available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx.  “Likely” is intentional 
here, because the mere fact that a transmission line runs into a state says nothing about whether there is 
available capacity on the path, or if there is energy available for purchase on the other end.  At the same 
time, referencing only immediately neighboring states is conservative because power also could be 
acquired from a non-RPS state located many states away, and neither Canada nor Mexico are 
accounted for here even though they have interconnections with portions of the United States grid. 
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Table 1: Number of Non-RPS States Bordering RPS Jurisdictions                       
with In-State Preferences 
 
State with In-State  
RPS Preference 
Neighboring Non-RPS / 
Voluntary RPS States 
Delaware 0 
Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
New Hampshire 1 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, Utah,  
West Virginia 
2 
Ohio, Texas 3 
Colorado, Missouri, North Carolina 4 
C.  Benefits and Costs 
The debate over a federal RPS’s likely benefits and costs is perhaps 
most remarkable for its focus.  It is much less about whether a national 
RPS will deliver renewables’ benefits better than the existing array of state 
laws than it is about whether there should be renewables-promoting laws at 
all.  This is particularly true on the environmental front, where RPS 
opponents concentrate on the laws’ efficiency rather than their efficacy.258  
Still the question remains:  Do RPSs really provide the benefits they 
promise? 
On this count, the jury remains out.  Because state RPSs are so young, 
the majority of studies examining their (likely) impacts are prospective.259  
Even if experience were longer, however, teasing out precise macro-social 
and -economic effects of any law, particularly one that seeks to reinvent 
                                                                                                                          
258 See, e.g., Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 84–88 (providing an overview of efficient 
environmental regulation).  One recent study found that, fifteen years after inception, a single state’s 
RPS would save over 145,000 tons per year in SOx emissions, 71,000 tons per year in NOx emissions, 
and over 31 million tons per year in CO2 emissions.  ATHANASIOS D. BOURNAKIS ET AL., THE 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN ILLINOIS 65–67 
(2005), available at http://www.erc.uic.edu/PDF/Clean_Energy_Development.pdf. Some 
commentators, however, have suggested that renewables’ environmental profits are over-assumed 
because increased renewables use simply may “put downward pressure on the cost of compliance with 
the environmental regulations” rather than “reduc[ing] aggregate emissions.”  CLIFF CHEN ET AL., 
WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY IMPACT PROJECTIONS 31 n.56 (2007), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMS/reports/61580.pdf. 
259 For a survey of state studies, see CHEN ET AL., supra note 258, at i–viii.  For an assessment of a 
twenty percent federal mandate, see generally Andy S. Kydes, Impacts of a Renewable Portfolio 
Generation Standard on US Energy Markets, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 809 (2007), and see also Nogee et al., 
supra note 211, at 33. 
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something as fundamental as our energy infrastructure, is “difficult if not 
intractable.”260  Moreover, studies that have tried to extrapolate from 
states’ experience to a possible federal one have varied widely in their 
results.  As one commentator aptly summarized, “[t]he outcomes of the 
currently available studies are so broad that the results seem to add little 
more than quantified speculations . . . . [Their] results indicate that the 
impact of a national RPS could be revolutionary or exceedingly 
moderate.”261 
Some studies have taken a more retrospective look at the state 
experience.  A 2008 analysis by the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory concluded that state RPSs are “[i]ncreasingly [m]otivating 
[r]enewable [e]nergy [d]evelopment,” with sixty percent of non-
hydroelectric generation additions since 2002 occurring in RPS states, and 
that figure rising to seventy-six percent for 2007.262  Such a finding speaks 
not only to RPSs’ ability to deliver on their core deployment objective but 
also to their likely national security impacts.  In the long view, any use of 
the national electric system to shift away from foreign oil must, in all 
likelihood, rely on both increasing renewable electricity consumption and a 
transition to electricity-based vehicles.263  Deploying additional renewables 
now advances the first of these factors.  Further, in the shorter term, 
increased renewables use should help national security in a different way 
by making fuel supplies less volatile.  Research increasingly points to 
supply volatility, rather than unavailability alone, as associated with the 
economic risks of energy dependence.264  Increased renewables use should 
help on this front because their availability relies on natural rather than 
economic cycles, thus providing a kind of “‘societal insurance’ against 
high fossil prices” during economic downturns.265 
Nevertheless, the extent to which RPSs have provided these security 
benefits by diversifying the generation fleet are underwhelming, at least so 
far.  Certainly some of this is because RPSs are relatively new; some of it 
                                                                                                                          
260 Kydes, supra note 259, at 814. 
261 Fershee, supra note 23, at 66. 
262 WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 12. 
263 Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL ENERGY AND FLEET MANAGEMENT: 
PLUG-IN VEHICLES OFFER POTENTIAL BENEFITS, BUT HIGH COSTS AND LIMITED INFORMATION COULD 
HINDER INTEGRATION INTO THE FEDERAL FLEET 13–16 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d09493.pdf (noting the importance of moving to electric vehicles in order to reduce reliance upon 
oil); Martin LaMonica, Electric Cars Seen as Killer App for Smart Grid, CNET NEWS, June 20, 2009, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10269723-54.html (noting that electric cars can reduce costs and 
“allow power generators to take better advantage of wind and solar power”).  Electricity comprises 
roughly forty percent of the nation’s energy consumption, and seventy-one percent of our petroleum 
use is in transportation.  EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 37. 
264 See generally Shimon Awerbuch, Determining the Real Cost: Why Renewable Power Is More 
Cost-Competitive Than Previously Believed, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 53 
(noting that “price volatility may well have more profound effects on economic well-being than 
temporary supply disruptions”). 
265 Id. at 3. 
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also must be attributed to certain states’ lagging compliance rates.266  More 
of it, however, may have to do with renewables’ relative costs.  Virtually 
all of the new renewables capacity spurred on by RPSs—ninety-three 
percent—has come from wind additions,267 no doubt because wind 
continues to offer one of the lowest prices among renewables.268  True, 
adding wind provides fuel diversification itself.  But without greater 
inroads from other resources, the national generation profile retains far 
more of its existing shape than one revolutionized by the rise of solar, 
biomass, tidal, or other alternative energies. 
State RPSs’ economic effects appear similarly moderate.  Although 
virtually every state that has studied the issue has predicted added jobs and 
industrial output from RPS enactments,269 research on state RPSs’ actual 
empirics has focused on price impacts.  Those data show three trends.  
First, state RPSs so far have not delivered the price decreases some 
analysts have projected for a federal measure.  Second, state RPSs have 
increased retail prices, but those increases generally have been small.  
Third, these price impacts have varied rather substantially by state.  For 
instance, a 2009 analysis by Wolf and Taran compared twelve RPS states’ 
retail prices with those of twenty-eight non-RPS states.  The study 
concluded that state RPSs caused “small” price increases—an average of 
two cents per kilowatt-hour—but the “variability in prices among states 
[was] far greater” than the average.270  The Lawrence Berkeley study 
reached a comparable result.  Estimating 2007 price impacts in twelve RPS 
jurisdictions, the study found that state RPSs have caused price increases 
of barely 0.1% (Maryland) to just over 1% (Connecticut and 
Massachusetts).271 
                                                                                                                          
266 See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 12, 21 (noting “limited” operational experience 
with RPSs and compliance problems in Arizona, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, and 
New York). 
267 Id. at 13. 
268 See, e.g., Frank Harris & Peter Navarro, Promoting Wind Energy Development in an Era of 
Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 34, 34 (noting that wind power “ranks second only 
to hydroelectricity as the cheapest source of renewable electricity generation”). 
269 CHEN ET AL., supra note 258, at 24. 
270 Christian Wolf & Zinaida Taran, The Impact of Renewable Portfolio Standards on Electricity 
Prices in the USA, in 2009 EABR & TLC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1, 4–5 (on file with author).  In 
2008, the average price of residential retail electricity in the United States was 11.36 cents/kilowatt-
hour.  EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 261. 
271 WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 29.  This observed trend is largely consistent with what 
many economists expect.  See Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards 
in the United States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8, 17 (surveying price impact projections ranging 
from roughly -6% to +9%, with a median of 0.7%). 
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D.  Power Forward?: Environmental Electricity, Efficacy Tendency, and 
Policy Difference 
This divergence in state RPS performance—from ranging renewables 
deployment to differing cost impacts—underscores the market 
fragmentation that state law’s dominance has engendered.  But this should 
not be surprising.  State RPSs do not just vary in how their eligibility rules 
and credit mechanisms define “renewable.”  They also differ remarkably in 
their policy designs. 
A simple dataset makes the point.  Plot the various state RPS targets 
and target dates against each other, and no obvious pattern emerges.  
Rather, as Figure 4 shows, the trend is one of difference, not uniformity.  
State targets range from less than five percent of retail sales to thirty 
percent.  Dates for compliance also are not uniform; they range from 2010 
to 2030.  And just because a state has a lower target does not mean that it 
will have an earlier compliance date, nor are later compliance dates 
necessarily correlated with higher targets.  All manner of combinations 
exist. 
 




                                                                                                                          
272 Iowa, which has an RPS that is less than one percent of its demand, is not included in Figure 4.  
Where states employ more than one RPS requirement—different percentages by energy “tier” or for 
different electricity provider status (investor-owned utility, cooperative, municipality, for instance)—
Figure 4 employs the higher requirement.  Figure 4 masks some similarities among RPSs because states 
with identical targets and target years appear as a single datapoint. 
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Examining other RPS design criteria further emphasizes this trend of 
difference.  Take two questions: (1) Is an RPS mandatory or voluntary?, 
and (2) Does it apply to all of the jurisdiction’s electricity providers or only 
some?  In neither case is there uniformity among state laws.  Rather, the 
two trends are reverse images of each other.  Most state RPSs are 
mandatory, but most do not apply to all electricity providers in their 
jurisdictions.  In fact, thirty-one states impose mandatory targets, while 
only five are voluntary.  In contrast, only less than half of state RPSs apply 
to all electricity providers, while twenty do not. 
The difference in state RPS policies becomes even more apparent 
when a systematic metric of RPS design is applied.  This might be referred 
to as the law’s “efficacy tendency.”  To calculate the efficacy tendency of 
any given RPS, the four RPS design attributes delineated above—the law’s 
aspirational aggressiveness, its salience distortion, its market definition, 
and its planning and enforcement rigor—can be assessed and scored on a 
scale of 0 to 5.  These four scores are then combined to reach a cumulative 
efficacy tendency ranking.  A ranking of 20 means the law should tend to 
be more effective than lower ranked laws.  A ranking closer to 0 means the 
law should tend to be less effective than higher ranked laws.  Thus, the 
most aggressive law with little salience distortion, a broad market 
definition, and strong planning and enforcement mechanisms should 
receive scores of 5 in each category, for a composite ranking of 20.  A 
weak law with great salience distortion, a narrow market definition, and 
anemic planning and enforcement mechanisms should receive lower 
scores, for a composite toward 0. 
For present purposes, most central is not the relative strength of state 
RPSs, but rather, the similarity or difference in their rankings.  Using the 
above methodology, efficacy tendencies were calculated for each of the 
thirty-six surveyed laws.  The results demonstrate just how divergent state 
RPS designs are.273  As shown in Figure 5, the laws’ composite scores vary 
substantially.  For instance, North Dakota received a relatively low 
composite score of 10.5, in part because its RPS is voluntary, it 
accordingly has no enforcement penalties, and its target is only ten 
percent.274  By contrast, Washington received a higher score of 14.5, in part 
because its law is mandatory, it does not exclude renewable resources, and 
                                                                                                                          
273 States’ efficacy tendency scores are reproduced in Appendix E.  The scoring criteria used are 
reproduced in Appendix F.  The efficacy tendency calculations presented here represent a 
preliminary—and admittedly imperfect—estimation of different RPSs’ relative strengths.  The metric is 
useful as a uniform measuring stick, against which state RPSs can be compared.  A more accurate 
efficacy tendency metric, however, would attempt to estimate more directly how much a given RPS 
should spur on renewables development.  For instance, the law’s mandatoriness might be separately 
scored from its aggressiveness, and its aggressiveness might be expressed as a mathematical function of 
(a) its target; (b) its salience distortion; and (c) the state’s current level of renewables use.  Further 
scholarship on this front may be warranted. 
274 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-34A-101 (2009). 
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it includes both enforcement penalties and advance planning 
requirements.275  In short, Figure 5 confirms that some states have what we 
should expect to be rather strong RPSs, but many other states have much 
weaker laws.  In fact, the state that ranks lowest on the efficacy tendency 
scale, Iowa, has a score, 8.5, that is barely half of the highest ranked state, 
California’s composite of 16.75.  States also are distributed widely across 
this range.  A full third of state efficacy tendency scores—twelve state 
scores—place one or more standard deviations from the median of 13.6.276 
 




State RPSs range even more widely in their individual design traits.  
Existing laws seem strongest in their aspirational aggressiveness and lack 
of salience distortion.  The mean scores for these traits are 4.0 and 3.4, 
respectively.278  States seem weaker in defining the renewable market 
broadly, and even more so in their planning and enforcement mechanisms.  
The respective means for these traits are 3.1 and 2.8.  These scores are not 
surprising given the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory’s finding that state 
RPSs appear to be fragmenting the renewables market.279  One would 
                                                                                                                          
275 See WASH REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(i)–(iii) (2010) (making targets mandatory); id. § 
19.285.030(18) (2010) (defining “renewable resource”); id. § 19.285.060(1) (2010) (providing for a 
penalty or noncompliance); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-190-040(1) (2010) (providing for annual 
reporting requirements).  
276 The mean for the composite scores is 13.3, the variance is 3.2, and the standard deviation is 
1.8. 
277 For graphing purposes, composite scores are rounded up. 
278 The median for aspirational aggressiveness is 4.5.  It is 3.5 for salience distortion. 
279 See WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 26. 
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expect a fragmented market to have a lower market definition score, with 
comparatively higher variation than other design traits. 
Indeed, state RPSs appear quite divergent in their market design.  
States’ market definition scores range between 1 and 5, for a spread of 4.  
States’ aspirational aggressiveness and planning and enforcement rigor 
scores each have a range of 3.5, from 1.5 to 5 and from 1 to 4.5, 
respectively, but a lower range for salience distortion.  That trait’s range is 
3: from a low of 2 to a high of 5.  This implies that states are more varied 
in the ways they define their RPS markets than how aggressive they are in 
setting their RPS goals.  A look at the distribution of the traits’ scores, 
shown in Figure 6, confirms this.  The only distribution that is at all 
“clumped”—implying less variance in state RPS design—is that of 
salience distortion.  The remaining distributions, including that for market 
definition, are well spread across a wider range, a fact confirmed by the 
distributions’ statistical variance.280 
 







                                                                                                                          
280 The traits’ statistical variances are 0.6 for salience distortion, but 1.0, 0.9, and 0.8 for the other 
three categories, respectively. 
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Most important, however, no state is the same.  For example, a state 
that scores high in its aspirational aggressiveness might score just as low in 
its planning and enforcement rigor—and vice versa.  Contrast, for instance, 
Connecticut and Michigan.  These two states received identical composite 
scores of 13, but how they got there differed greatly.  Connecticut had a 
“perfect” score of 5 for its aspirational aggressiveness but only a 2.5 for its 
market definition.  Michigan, on the other hand, earned a 3.5 for its 
aspirational aggressiveness and a 3 for its market definition; it was higher, 
at a score of 4.5, on its planning and enforcement rigor than was 
Connecticut, which earned a 2.  The point is plain.  State design of RPSs 
differs greatly, not just in general, but within and among attributes as well. 
All of this is critical because of the mixed message it sends the market.  
It tells investors that renewables have different values in different 
jurisdictions; it makes the assessment of where and whether to build more 
complex; and it introduces uncertainty precisely because the cumulative 
RPS regime is so complex, and because there are so many parts to it that 
can change.281 
The stark variation in RPS policy designs is also important, however, 
for what it says on the federal-state RPS debate.  Good policy design does 
not simply advance a law’s primary goal.  It will also maximize any other 
benefits and minimize any other costs the law might impose.282  What the 
variation in state RPS design may mean, then, is that there is further reason 
to move to a federal law.  Certainly, RPS design alone cannot account for 
states’ successes and failures.  Many other factors impact how well an RPS 
performs—from the overall retail market structure to financial community 
expectations.283  But it is also true that any RPS’s success depends heavily 
on its “implementation specifics.”284  Accordingly, from a benefits-costs 
perspective, a federal RPS holds the power, potentially at least, to offer 
something a state regime cannot:  If designed well,285 a federal RPS has the 
                                                                                                                          
281 See Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 29; Fershee, supra note 23, at 66–68. 
282 Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk 
Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U.  L. REV. 957, 961 (2001). 
283 See Cory & Swezey, supra note 113, at 29–30. 
284 Id. at 27. 
285 The question of how a federal RPS would be designed is critical.  A well designed, aggressive 
federal RPS should accomplish what a mélange of state laws cannot; a poorly designed law could 
exacerbate, rather than correct, state law problems.  Indeed, it is clear that any federal measure will 
present many, if not all, of the same design questions that state RPSs do.  The proposed Waxman-
Markey legislation, for instance, would set a 20% RPS, but apply only to utilities that sell 4 million 
MWh of electricity per year.  It also would count efficiency measures and exclude from its base 
calculation certain non-renewable power production such as new nuclear and fossil-fired plants that 
employ carbon capture and sequestration technology, so that its goal is not actually 20%.  See 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009).  The ACELA 
legislation would set a 15% renewables requirement but would also count efficiency and allow for 
various waivers and compliance by payment.  See American Clean Energy Leadership Act, S. 1462, 
111th Cong., § 132(a) (2009).  In short, any advocacy for a federal RPS must begin with the 
proposition that its requirement would both: (1) set a minimum “floor” percentage that would expand 
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chance to more uniformly reap renewables’ benefits—to capitalize on 
states’ experimentation by adopting a single law that bolsters states’ 
strengths and ameliorates their flaws.286 
VI.  RESHAPING THE LANDSCAPE: 
MERGING ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
The fact that state RPSs so heavily risk undermining their very purpose 
militates for taking the law national.  In the political back-and-forth over 
the RPS’s ancillary effects, its fundamental premise has been misplaced.  
The RPS, whether state or federal, requires a well-functioning, liquid 
market.  The way state RPSs have been built so far, they confound this 
purpose, not fulfill it.  This is the core justification for transitioning the 
RPS away from a thirty-six-jurisdiction regime to a central one.  It must 
not get lost in the shuffle. 
Still, the question remains:  Can a federal RPS do something more than 
simply strengthen state efforts?  So far, the arguments not answered by the 
need for a uniform renewables market tend to stake their claims against a 
national RPS, not for it.  They fail to make their case. 
Complaints, for instance, about winners and losers sound ominous, but 
they say nothing about how best to make an RPS work.  The truth is that 
the only reason the winners-and-losers claim can be lodged at all is 
because there are different winners and losers today.  Coal-rich states 
benefit economically from its extraction, just as do oil-rich states and 
uranium-rich states.  A law that would also benefit renewables-rich states 
on the way to a more sustainable society is not inequitable.  It is sound 
policy.287  Moreover, the winners-and-losers argument skews the facts.  
Numerous studies have shown that every state has renewable resources 
utilizable under a national RPS.288  In any event, nothing about a national 
                                                                                                                          
the nation’s renewables use significantly above what current state laws would; and (2) allow for and 
encourage concurrent state requirements that exceed that floor.  This type of cooperative federalism 
approach is necessary because the passage of federal legislation is always rife with opportunity for rent-
seeking by interested players. 
286 See Shelley Welton, From the States Up: Building a National Renewable Energy Policy, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 996 (2008). 
287 See generally ED SMELOFF & PETER ASMUS, REINVENTING ELECTRIC UTILITIES: 
COMPETITION, CITIZEN ACTION, AND CLEAN POWER (1997); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT 
THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO 
SUSTAINABILITY (2008); Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy from 
the Bottom-Up? An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95 (2006); 
J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 31 (1999); Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA 
L. REV. 121 (2008). 
288 See Sovacool & Cooper, Hidden Costs, supra note 171, at 35; see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMPLEMENTING BOTH A 25-PERCENT 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD AND A 25-PERCENT RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2025, at 14 
(Aug. 2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/eeim/pdf/sroiaf(2007)05.pdf 
(“Considerable increases in biomass electricity generation occur in virtually every region of the United 
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RPS dictates that a utility serving, say, Georgia, must develop its 
renewable portfolio there, as is evident from the very fact that many 
utilities serve multiple states.289  The Georgia company could break ground 
on a renewables facility in a neighboring state and then send the power 
home—or capitalize on renewables 2500 miles away and then use or sell 
the RECs, or both.290 
Claims that a national RPS should stall because a feed-in tariff regime 
would better promote renewables likewise ring hollow.  The biggest 
problem with the feed-in tariff is that every new policy initiative must start 
somewhere, and the feed-in tariff shoulders perhaps the heaviest burden in 
the American political lexicon—the moniker of “tax.”  As former CIA 
Director James Woolsey recently noted, feed-in tariffs have “the worst 
name in the business.”291  The RPS avoids this problem; even if its name is 
not the catchiest, it is not a tax, and it already has substantial momentum 
behind it.  Besides, casting the RPS and the feed-in tariff as an either/or 
choice is unnecessarily narrow.  Opponents of environmental protection 
long have used false dichotomies to wage their campaigns.292  This is yet 
another case.  Scholarship increasingly shows that the RPS and the feed-in 
tariff could work in tandem to achieve renewables deployment more 
effectively than either could alone.293 
A.  The Energy-Environment Merger 
Setting these federal challenges aside, there is another RPS 
justification that the debate so far has overlooked but that deserves 
consideration:  A national RPS will bring energy and environmental law 
closer together.294  It is well-documented that energy and environmental 
law operate in separate worlds that rarely overlap, despite the fact that their 
                                                                                                                          
States [under a 25% RPS].”); Nogee et al., supra note 211, at 39 (“[A]ll regions do have some 
renewable energy resources, and would likely see an increase in using local resources for generation 
[under an RPS].”).  
289 See supra Part III.C.  
290 See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 135, at 107–08. 
291 Phil Taylor, House Will Get Another Shot at Feed-in Tariffs, GREENWIRE, Aug. 3, 2009, 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/08/03/6/. 
292 Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of 
the Legal Response to the Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach Environmentalists Today, 
31 ENVTL. L. 229, 350–52, 356–57 (2001). 
293 See Rickerson et al., supra note 204, at 83–84; see also KARLYNN CORY ET AL., FEED-IN 
TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 9–11 (Mar. 2009), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf. 
294 For further discussion on the argument for bringing energy law and environmental law closer 
together, see generally, for instance, Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-
Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010), and Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental 
Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010). 
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subject matters are intrinsically intertwined.295  Energy and the 
environment are two sides of the same problem.  Energy law dictates our 
resource use; environmental law controls the effects of that use.  Energy 
use drives our ecological problems; those problems cause us to question 
how we use energy.  Combining the rules that govern different aspects of 
the same problem only makes sense. 
First, and most importantly, the RPS helps meld energy and 
environmental law by pushing them toward a shared aim.  Much of why 
energy and environmental law have remained so divergent is because they 
share disparate pasts.  Energy law arose from economic concerns and 
utility regulation—the need for a consistent power supply at a reasonable 
price.296  Environmental law, by contrast, sprung from a tradition of risk 
reduction and resource management—the need to protect society against 
toxics and the tragedy of the commons.297  The RPS seeks to pull the fields 
away from their differing pasts and push them forward toward a common 
future, at least for electricity regulation. 
The way the RPS does this is straightforward.  It takes energy law’s 
consumption-focused objective of ample supply and tempers it with 
environmental law’s hope for a healthier, more sustainable world.  It takes 
environmental law’s technology-centered end-of-pipe remediation tools 
and replaces them with energy law’s front-end resource planning 
principles.298  It takes, in other words, elements of both fields and mixes 
them together—merging, in part, the disciplines. 
Second, the RPS combines energy and environmental law by using a 
target-and-trading scheme, the very kind of market-based regulation that 
both fields increasingly embrace.  For energy law, the trend is seen in the 
movement away from cost-of-service ratemaking and toward market-based 
                                                                                                                          
295 E.g., Kenneth A. Manaster, An Introductory Analysis of Energy Law and Policy, 22 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1151, 1158 (1982); Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand 
Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 728 (1995). 
296 See supra Part II.A. 
297 See, e.g., Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 
517–19 (2007); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164–65 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the Co-
Evolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063, 1080 (2007).  For 
critiques of environmental law’s failure to sufficiently join science and policy, see ROBERT B. KEITER, 
KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, & AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS, at x–xi 
(2003); Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in 
Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 249–51 (2003); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the 
Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1059, 1059–60, 1102 (2008). 
298 Compare Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental 
Mind?, 3 WIS. L. REV. 463, 472–76 (1989), with Clinton A. Vince et al., Integrated Resource 
Planning: The Case for Exporting Comprehensive Energy Planning to the Developing World, 25 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 371, 382–84 (1993); see also David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing 
Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2009). 
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rates.299  For environmental law, it comes in the shift from command-and-
control pollution limits to market-oriented regimes, such as cap-and-trade 
measures.300  The RPS similarly relies on the market to achieve its 
statutorily imposed objective.  Rather than dictating utility-by-utility a 
percentage of renewables that each company must acquire (as could have 
occurred through state regulatory proceedings), the RPS sets a target and 
then expects utilities to rely on the market to meet that target most 
efficiently.  Thus, the RPS moves energy and environmental law closer 
together by showing that, as a practical matter, merging the fields might 
not be as difficult as one would presume.  In the RPS, there is an example 
of how a tool increasingly used by both fields also can be employed to 
pursue an objective that blends both of their aims. 
Despite, however, the RPS’s ability to join energy and environmental 
law in a way they rarely have been before, no one is touting this as a 
rationale for a federal RPS.  Why? 
Perhaps the reason is that the merger’s likely benefits are so obvious.  
Holistic governance is virtually always better than fragmentation: more 
effective, more efficient, more robust.301  Or, perhaps this justification has 
not garnered attention because the fields have become so disconnected that 
the reasons for combining them no longer are plain.  “Today, energy laws 
and environmental laws are administered separately, by separate 
agencies . . . based on different . . . assumptions.”302  There thus is utility in 
fleshing out what dividends, if any, an environmental-energy law merger 
might yield. 
The most obvious is efficiency.  Combining energy and environmental 
law should realign the fields’ goals so that they work hand-in-hand rather 
than at odds.  From the electric generation perspective, this is the 
jurisdictional fragmentation problem Peter Huber described decades ago.303  
Environmental law labors to curb, for instance, plants’ SOx and NOx 
pollution, while energy regulation’s emphasis on reliable but inexpensive 
                                                                                                                          
299 See supra Part II.B. 
300 See, e.g., Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from 
Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19, 24 (1995); Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as 
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 
GEO. L.J. 257, 270 (2001); Michael C. Naughton, Establishing Interstate Markets for Emissions 
Trading of Ozone Precursors, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 233 (1994). 
301 Cf. Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, “Hot Fuss”? Assessing the Value of Connecting Suburban 
Sprawl, Land Use and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1217, 1236–38 
(2007) (assessing potential benefits from combining land and water planning). 
302 Joseph P. Tomain, To a Point, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2006). 
303 See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1013–15, 1025 (1987) (“The heart of the problem is the division of authority 
among several separate agencies . . . . EPA’s regulatory agenda focuses mainly on continuous low-level 
emissions of conventional pollutants . . . . FERC reigns over its smaller regulatory kingdom in equally 
regal isolation . . . . The problem is that aggregate [environmental] impact depends as much on the mix 
of technologies chosen as on the environmental burden imposed by each alone . . . .”). 
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electricity perpetuates construction of the very facilities that produce those 
emissions.  The right hand does not control what the left is doing, and the 
left is undoing what the right is attempting.  RPSs compel the hands to 
work together, at least to a degree.  They command deployment of 
generation facilities that promote both fields’ objectives: sufficient 
electricity supplies for energy law and less pollution for environmental 
law.  RPSs, in other words, create a regulatory efficiency that did not exist 
before: a synthesis of policy aims. 
A related benefit is the potential for regulatory synergies.  Making 
energy and environmental law overlap may help the fields not only better 
achieve their own objectives, but may also propel them to do more than 
each would individually.  Take again the example of a new power plant.  
There, environmental law’s objectives might be considered fully achieved 
if the plant meets applicable pollution controls.  Likewise, energy law’s 
objectives are satisfied if the facility assures a sufficient electricity supply 
at a reasonable cost.  Under the RPS, both fields better achieve their goals 
by not undermining each other.  But RPSs can do more.  The RPS might, 
for instance, help the facility’s owner exceed mandated pollution 
reductions.304  The owner also might go beyond energy law’s standard 
objective of a sufficient electricity supply because renewable sources are, 
by definition, more abundant than nonrenewables over time. 
Another possible benefit is improved decision making.  Most notably, 
this may occur when regulators who traditionally have not consulted each 
other begin sharing tools, data, and expertise across the regulatory divide.  
This has begun in other contexts where, for instance, land and water 
planners increasingly rely on each other’s expertise,305 and it could happen 
for energy and environmental law as well.  Environmental regulators that 
increasingly operate markets might have much to learn from utility 
regulators whose traditional bailiwick is economic supervision.  Utility 
regulators, likewise, might find in environmental law’s historic technology 
promotion306 ways to make RPSs run more smoothly.  This is, in other 
words, the regulatory “cross-pollenization” benefit of merging energy and 
environmental law.307 
Finally, combining energy and environmental law may have a long-
term benefit.  It may help gear our policies toward sustainability.  
Returning once again to the new power plant example, it is obvious that 
today, with or without an RPS, utilities can choose to construct renewable-
fueled facilities.  What, then, does the RPS add?  The RPS requires a more 
                                                                                                                          
304 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Abe et al., NETS: Capturing Electricity Information in New England, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 1999, at 46, 51. 
305 See Davies, Hot Fuss, supra note 301, at 1269–74. 
306 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 21, at 29 & n.19, 33 & n.39. 
307 Davies, Hot Fuss, supra note 301, at 1237–38. 
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complete internalization of long-term externalities than health-based 
pollution regulation does now.  For example, today’s pollution laws do not 
include the intergenerational value of depleted nonrenewable resources; the 
public health effects unforeseen or not captured by politically-brokered 
emissions standards; or the benefits, aesthetic, moral, ecological, or 
otherwise, of moving toward a pollution-minimal world.  To be sure, each 
of these objectives already is embedded in other areas of environmental 
law, but only to a small degree.  Likewise, a direct tax or a permitting 
system that includes these externalities’ full cost could capture them, 
perhaps more efficiently than an RPS.308  The problem, however, is that 
those tools typically rely on immediately quantifiable societal costs—and 
then only the politically palatable ones.309  Politicians, however, have 
intense incentives to avoid imposing on their constituents short-term costs 
that produce primarily long-term benefits.  This is precisely why the RPS 
is important.  It can provide an assurance that the energy supply going 
forward will be more sustainable.  It can, in other words, make energy and 
environmental law not just more market-correcting, but also more 
planning-perfecting. 
B.  The Federal-State Debate 
That the RPS can help merge environmental and energy law, and that 
this merger promises significant benefits, thus seems clear.  The question 
remains, however, whether the fact that there are benefits to be gained 
from an RPS-induced energy-and-environmental-law merger says anything 
about whether the RPS should be local or national. 
One obvious response is that, simply because of its scope, a national 
RPS is more appropriate.  The 2008 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory study 
showed that state RPSs at the time applied to just under half of the United 
States’ electric demand.310  By definition, a national RPS should 
dramatically increase this figure.311  Thus, whether the RPS benefits in 
question are direct or supplementary, a coast-to-coast RPS that delivers 
these benefits nationwide should be favored over a state-by-state approach 
that is inherently limited in reach. 
That response alone may be enough.  There is, however, another, 
                                                                                                                          
308 Michaels, Smart Policy, supra note 147, at 86–87. 
309 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun 
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 45–51 (2008); Richard J. 
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To Liberate the Future, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1153–54, 1157 (2009); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 999–1000 (1999). 
310 WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 114, at 5–6. 
311 It is unlikely a federal standard would apply to 100% of electric demand because some utilities 
would be exempted.  The federal mandate also would need to be set higher than states’ aggregate 
target—an essential feature of any federal RPS.  See supra note 285. 
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perhaps stronger argument for a national law.  It is that the RPS’s merging 
of energy and environmental law could put the fields on a new path.  Prior 
attempts to directly combine energy and environmental law are few and far 
between and, even then, have been modest in their aims.312 
The RPS is different.  It is bold, pervasive.  It seeks to change the 
shape of what is, effectively, nearly half of the United States’ energy 
supply,313 and it compels that change to start now.  The RPS is thus unlike 
our past, meeker efforts at energy regulatory reform, centered so heavily 
on research, funding, and fumbling toward sustainability.314  The RPS 
demands a new vision.  It looks beyond the world where energy 
consumption and environmental protection necessarily conflict.  It searches 
for a different direction, a space where energy and environmental law work 
together, not apart. 
The RPS, in other words, has the potential to act much like an off-ramp 
on a highway.  Taking it might help put us on a course other regulatory 
tools cannot.  It could begin a long-term cultural transition to a society 
reliant on resources that are not scarce rather than attempting to mitigate 
the ecological effects of consuming those that are. 
Undoubtedly, the current regime of state-based RPSs also might 
accomplish this, but only to a point.  A federal law is more likely to 
succeed at overhauling a regulatory system with coast-to-coast effects.  
The national stage is simply bigger.  Federal law carries an “imprimatur” 
that state law does not.315  It says more, more loudly, to more people.  A 
federal RPS, accordingly, would not just push more of our generation 
supply to sustainable sources, it is more likely to be seen as an example for 
how to merge energy and environmental goals in other contexts.  It is, in 
short, more likely to convey the message that reconciling energy and 
environmental law is not a local priority, it is national. 
 If, then, what we seek in an RPS is not just a first big step toward a 
more sustainable culture, but also a way to begin reinventing our system of 
regulation—to move power regulation forward—the path there seems 
clear.  It is the same path all the other RPS evidence points to: a national 
one. 
                                                                                                                          
312 Matthew Fong, Fueling Change: Judicial Review of CAFE Standards, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 759, 
762–64 (2008); Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stoermer, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: 
PURPA Reform, the Amendments and Their Implications, 27 ENERGY L.J. 25, 25–26 (2006). 
313 In 2008, electricity accounted for just over forty percent of national energy consumption.  See 
EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 22, at 37. 
314 See Davies, Energy Policy, supra note 106, at 78–79. 
315 Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 
197 (2009); see also William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 
719, 723 (1995).  Many scholars refer to this as the “expressive” value of a law.  See, e.g., Matthew D. 
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000); 
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1688–71 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
There are many reasons why proposals for a national RPS remain in 
gridlock, but the most troubling may be that the public debate has lost 
focus.  Its ascendancy through the states has made the RPS many things, 
but at its core, it is still about one—promoting renewables deployment to, 
in turn, begin changing the shape of our energy infrastructure.  Focusing on 
whether the RPS has merit at all is wasted effort; with thirty-six local 
measures already in place, the point is moot.  The question that remains is 
whether a state-based or a federal system will best accomplish the RPS’s 
objectives. 
Here the evidence is not mixed.  The current state-based regime 
threatens to undermine the very goals it pursues.  Existing state RPSs 
prevent the formation of a uniform renewables market because they define 
what is renewable, and what is a renewable credit, so differently.  They 
then exacerbate this market distortion by erecting a stunning number of 
geographical barriers to trade.  All these problems are then only reinforced 
by the myriad state RPS policy designs, a phenomenon overwhelmingly 
confirmed by application of the “efficacy tendency” metric developed here. 
A federal approach cannot promise panacea, but it can fix the problems 
the state regime has created.  A national approach would create a national 
market—fundamentally important since markets are the regulatory tool the 
RPS invokes.  A national RPS also could have another, often overlooked 
benefit.  It could reinforce the RPS’s own efforts by helping energy and 
environmental law merge.  If energy truly “is the center stage upon which 
environmental law . . . will be played” in the years to come,316 either of 
these reasons might be justification enough for a federal RPS.  Together, 
they make a strong case indeed. 
Over seventy years ago, in a very different context, the Supreme Court 
warned that our nation “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the 
several states must sink or swim together.”317  With the muddle of state 
RPSs looming and a federal proposal on the table in every recent session, 
perhaps it is time for Congress to begin heeding the Court’s advice. 
                                                                                                                          
316 Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 262 (2005). 
317 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
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APPENDIX A: ELIGIBLE RESOURCES BY STATE 
 











Arizona ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
California ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Colorado ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
Connecticut ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● ● 
Delaware ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
District  
of Columbia ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Hawaii ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Illinois ● ● ● ● ● ●    
Iowa ● ● ● ● ●     
Kansas ● ● ● ● ● ●    
Maine ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Maryland ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Massachusetts ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Michigan ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Minnesota ● ● ● ● ● ●    
Missouri ● ● ● ● ● ●    
Montana ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
Nevada ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
New 
Hampshire ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
New Jersey ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
New Mexico ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
New York ● ● ● ●  ●  ●  
North 
Carolina ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
North Dakota ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Ohio ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
Oregon ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Pennsylvania ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
Rhode Island ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
South Dakota ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Texas ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Utah ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Vermont ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Virginia ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Washington ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
West Virginia ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
Wisconsin ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  
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APPENDIX B: CREDIT MULTIPLIERS BY STATE 
State Credit Multipliers 
Arizona Multiple, additive multipliers up to 200%  
Colorado 
“Community based” eligible generation (125%) 
Solar (300%) 
Delaware 
Off-shore wind (350% pre-2017) 
Renewables-based fuel cell (300% pre-2014) 
Solar (300% DG, in-state PV pre-2014) 
Wind (150% in-state pre-2012) 
District of Columbia 
Methane (110% pre-2010) 
Solar and wind (120% pre-2007) 
Solar and wind (110% pre-2010) 
Maine “Community-based” generation (150%) 
Maryland 
Methane (110% pre-2009) 
Wind (120% pre-2006, 110% pre-2009) 
Michigan 
Solar (300%) 
Certain in-state and other power (110-20%) 
Advanced cleaner energy (up to 1000%) 
Nevada 
Efficiency reductions in peak demand (200%) 
Solar (240% for certain customer-sited PV) 
New Mexico Agency authority to vary REC value by technology 
Ohio Biomass (potential multiplier based on price) 
Oregon 
Certain state-owned backup generators (200%) 
Solar (200%) 
Texas Non-wind (200%) 





Distributed generation (200%) 
State apprenticeship construction (120%) 
West Virginia 
Renewable facilities sited on in-state reclaimed 
surface mines (150%) 
Renewable distributed generation (200%) 
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APPENDIX C: REC SHELF LIVES BY STATE 
State REC Shelf Life 
Arizona Unlimited 
California Unlimited 
Colorado 5 years 
Connecticut 3 years 
Delaware 3 years 
District of Columbia 3 years 
Illinois Unlimited 
Maine 2 years, up to 33% of the going-forward requirement  
Maryland 3 years 
Massachusetts 2 years, up to 30% of the going-forward requirement 
Minnesota 4 years 
Missouri 3 years 
Montana 2 years 
Nevada Up to 4 years,  in PUC’s discretion 
New Hampshire 2.25 years, up to 30% of the going-forward requirement 
New Jersey Current year only (except  for solar RECs = 2 years) 
New Mexico 4 years 
North Carolina 10 years 
Ohio 5 years 
Oregon Unlimited, up to 20% of the going-forward requirement 
Pennsylvania 3 years 
Rhode Island 3 years, up to 30% of the going-forward requirement 
Texas 3 years 
Utah Unlimited 
Virginia Unlimited 
Washington 3 years 
West Virginia Unlimited 
Wisconsin 5 years 
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APPENDIX D: GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS BY STATE 
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APPENDIX E: EFFICACY TENDENCY SCORES 






Enforcement  Composite  
Arizona 4 3.75 3 3 13.75 
California 4.5 4.75 4.5 3 16.75 
Colorado 4.5 2 2 2.5 11 
Connecticut 5 3.5 2.5 2 13 
Delaware 4.5 4 3 4.5 16 
D.C. 4.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 14 
Hawaii 5 3.5 3 2.5 14 
Illinois 5 3.5 3 3.5 15 
Iowa 3 3 1 1.5 8.5 
Kansas 4.5 3 2 2.5 12 
Maine 3.5 2.75 3.5 2 11.75 
Maryland 4.5 3.5 3 4.5 15.5 
Massachusetts 4.5 5 3 2.5 15 
Michigan 3.5 2 3 4.5 13 
Minnesota 5 4 2 3.5 14.5 
Missouri 4 3 2 4 13 
Montana 4 4.75 2.5 2.5 13.75 
Nevada 5 3 3 3.5 14.5 
New Hampshire 4.5 4.25 3 2.5 14.25 
New Jersey 4.5 3.5 3.5 3 14.5 
New Mexico 4.5 3 2 2.5 12 
New York 5 3.5 1.5 1 11 
North Carolina 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 12.5 
North Dakota 1.5 3.5 4 1.5 10.5 
Ohio 5 2.5 2 3 12.5 
Oregon 5 3.5 3.5 3 15 
Pennsylvania 4 2.5 2.5 4 13 
Rhode Island 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 14.5 
South Dakota 1.5 3.5 5 1.5 11.5 
Texas 3 3.25 3 2 11.25 
Utah 2.5 2.5 4 2 11 
Vermont 2.5 5 5 1.5 14 
Virginia 2 3 4.5 2 11.5 
Washington 4 4 3.5 3 14.5 
West Virginia 5 2 3 3.5 13.5 
Wisconsin 3.5 4 4 3.5 15 
Mean 4.0 3.4 3.1 2.8 13.3 
Median 4.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 13.6 
Variance 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 3.2 
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APPENDIX F: EFFICACY TENDENCY SCORING METRIC 
Aspirational Aggressiveness     
Compulsoriness Mandatory Voluntary    
 2.5 0.5    
Aggressiveness Target ≥ 25% 
Target = 
20–24% 
Target =    
15–19% 
Target =   
10–14% 
Target        
< 10% 
 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 
 
Salience Distortion   
Actual Energy Sales / Energy Capacity  
 1 0.5  
Grandfathering New construction (within 2 yrs.) 
Lite grandfathering 
(within 10 yrs.) 
Grandfathering  
(>10 yrs.) 
 1 0.5 0 
Credit Multipliers No multipliers Weak multipliers Heavy multipliers 
 1 0.5 0 
Dilution Renewables only Renewables plus efficiency or co-gen 
Renewables plus 
fossil or nuclear 
 1 0.5 0 
Utility Class Exemptions No exemptions Exemptions = 1 Exemptions ≥ 1 
 1 0.75 0.5 
 
Market Definition    
Source Breadth All renewables Some limits Extensive limits 
 2 1 0 
Geographic Breadth No limits Regional limits In-state limits 
 1 0.5 0 
REC Use Uses RECs Uses RECs with limits Does not use RECs 
 2 1 0 
 
Planning and Enforcement Rigor    
Enforcement Agency-enforced Self-policing   
 1 0   
Penalties Strong Medium Weak None 
 2 1 0.5 0 
Cost Recovery Guaranteed If prudent Silent  
 1 0.5 0  
Planning / 
Compliance 
Advance planning and 
annual proceeding 




 1 0.5 0  
 
